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ABSTRACT 
The Semantics of Indicative Mood Modal Constructions 
by 
Michael Barkasi 
John MacFarlane and Andy Egan have recently argued that a number of examples, "third-
party assessments," show that the contextualist view on "epistemic modals" held by Hack-
ing, Teller and DeRose is incorrect. They argue that the examples support a relativistic 
semantics for epistemic modality. I argue that not every utterance of a modal sentence 
involving 'may' or 'possible that' expresses the epistemic reading, that the problematic ex-
amples are cases where the utterance is ambiguous between epistemic and circumstantial 
readings, and that it is the circumstantial reading which drives the problematic third-party 
assessments. The treatment presented here is similar to that of John Hawthorne and von 
Fintel and Gillies. A major component of the thesis is a careful study of the way in which 
contextual factors affect both the "flavor" of possibility expressed by an utterance and the 
ability of a speaker to defend their modal claim against problematic third-party assessments. 
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PREFACE 
This project on epistemic modals began in the fall semester of 2009 when I read Seth 
Yalcin's paper "Epistemic modals." (Yalcin, 2007) For awhile I was interested in giving 
a simpler, dynamic updated-based semantic solution to "Yalcin's problem," but became 
convinced that Moritz Schulz, in (2009), had essentially given the response I had in mind. 
So I moved on to MacFarlane's problem. Luckily no one has sketched quite the thought I 
had on that one! 
This project falls squarely in the tradition of finding truth conditions for expressions of 
natural language, in this case for certain modal sentences in English which I dub Moorean 
indicative mood modal constructions. It also is an exercise in "utterance semantics," it is 
assumed that, due to contextual dependences, it is usually utterances of sentences which 
are true or false and not sentences themselves. One will not find though any claim in this 
thesis of the form "An utterance of ... is true if and only if .... " This is partly because 
I don't know what the right truth conditions are for the epistemic reading of utterances 
of Moorean indicative mood modals. I am actually sympathetic to the classical contex-
tualism of Hacking et al. The main thrust of this thesis is to argue that the supposed 
"problematic examples"-which have been so much grist for the mill of contemporary liter-
ature on "epistemic modals" and are supposed to show that classical contextualism cannot 
be correct-are not driven by the epistemic reading of utterances of Moorean indicative 
mood modals. It is a circumstantial reading of the utterance which drives the problematic 
evaluations. This idea is close to John Hawthorne's, who suggests that the problematic 
examples involve a "danger" reading. The circumstantial reading is more general though: 
every "danger" modal is circumstantial, but not every circumstantial modal is a "danger" 
modal nor is it future directed. 
An important feature of my proposal is the main argument about retractions. As I 
sketch out below, I take it that the best argument for taking the problematic utterances of 
eavesdroppers as appropriate or correct is that they force the speaker to retract their original 
claim, or at least make it inappropriate for the speaker to defend their original claim as true. 
VI 
It is that the original utterance expressed a circumstantial modal, I claim, which drives this 
speaker retraction. More importantly, cases where there is a salient circumstantial reading 
to the utterance are the only cases, I claim, where this speaker retraction happens. Clear 
cases of utterances of epistemic modals are not cases where the speaker is forced to retract. 
Another reason one will not find any truth conditions here is that I'm not sure that 
project is a good one. It is supposed to be a descriptive project: an utterance ... is true, 
as used in the language, if and only if ... But whose use are we trying to describe? The 
use of the common folk, the use of trained grammarians, the use of philosophers, logicians, 
or someone else? Where is the line between the "usual use" in the "natural language" and 
the theorizing of philosophers? When mining for intuitions on the cases, to whom ought 
I go? Of course, there are more high brow concerns of the sort expressed by Wittgenstein 
or Quine lurking the background as well. One could doubt, as I do, whether there really is 
anything, intentional or extensional, which determines truth conditions for Sally when she 
utters "Joe may be in Boston." 
1 Introduction 
Modals are words like 'may,' 'possible,' 'must,' 'necessary,' 'eventually,' 'ought to,' 'have 
to,' and 'permissible' which combine with an independent clause, called the prejacent, to 
say something about its mode of truth. (Goldblatt, 2006, 2) Examples of modal sentences, 
i.e. sentences whose "main connective" is a modal term, include, 
Joe may be in Boston. 
It's possible that he will be late. 
Sleuth will eventually crack the case. 
Bill needs to keep in better touch with John and Jane. 
Fred probably shouldn't buy lottery tickets at all. 
It's permissible to disagree with the authors of Master's theses. 
It's possible for there to be Chalmers zombies. 
It is assumed in this project that utterances are the carriers of truth value. Sentences, 
because of potential contextual dependencies, are not true or false, although the truth value 
of utterances of a single sentence can be invariant. Thus utterances of modal sentences say 
things about what is possible. The utterance "Joe may be in Boston" says that Joe being 
in Boston is possibly true. 
Of course, one sort of possibility that philosophers like to trade in is logical or alethic 
possibility. An utterance of "It's possible for there to be Chalmers zombies" presumably 
expresses this sort of possibility. Examples from philosophical literature aside, the consensus 
is that utterances of modal sentences generally do not express logical possibility. Natural 
language is rife with deontic, temporal, bouletic, circumstantial and teleological modalities 
to name a few, e.g. "It's permissible to stay late," "Eventually we'll win," "He just must 
love me," "1 have to sneeze" and "1 need to buy a hammer to finish the project." But 
there is another bunch of modal sentences common in English which don't seem to express 
either logical possibilities or the ones just mentioned. They are sentences paradigmatically 
involving the locution 'possible that' or 'may' on its non-deontic reading. For example: 
1 
Joe may be in Boston. 
It's possible that he will be late. 
Fred may win the lottery. 
You might have left your keys in the car. 
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G.E. Moore, and then Ian Hacking, noted that utterances of these sentences have a peculiar 
feature. They often cannot be truly said by someone who knows that their prejacent is 
false. As Hacking says, if he is sitting in a room and can see that there are only a few chairs 
in the room he could not truly say "It's possible that there are two hundred chairs in this 
room." 
Picking up on this cue, Moore and the literature that followed him suggested that utter-
ances of these sentences express epistemic possibility, hence the name "epistemic modals." 
To say "Joe may be in Boston" is to say something about what's possible, given what's 
known. But known by whom? The "contextualist" position developed by this literature 
suggests that an utterance of this type is true just in case the prejacent is not ruled out by 
what's known to some group determined by the context of utterance. The problem, now well 
known to those who have read the contemporary literature, is that people often evaluate 
the truth of utterances of this sort in a way which isn't compatible with the contextualist 
story. To use MacFarlane's example, if Sally says to George "Joe may be in Boston" and 
you overhear her, on the supposition that you just saw Joe down the hall here in Berkeley it 
seems natural for you to say "That's not true, he can't be in Boston." People often seem to 
evaluate utterances of these claims based on what they know, not based on some perceived 
contextually determined group. 
This problem has given rise to a number of positions on "epistemic modals," including 
relativism, expressivism and fancier versions of contextualism. The position laid out in 
this paper falls somewhere in between the cloudy contextualism of von Fintel and Gillies 
and the "danger reading" of John Hawthorne. First, it seems clear that utterances of 
modal sentences in the relevant form often express non-epistemic readings, in particular 
circumstantial readings. There isn't one particular "flavor" of modality, to use von Fintel 
and Gillies' term, which is usually expressed by utterances of these sentences. In line with 
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von Fintel and Gillies I argue that the problematic cases are cases where the utterance is 
actually ambiguous between a number of different readings, while in line with Hawthorne I 
argue that the reading which drives the problematic evaluations in the problematic cases is 
the circumstantial reading. When Sally says "Joe may be in Boston" what you, the kibitzer, 
are evaluating as false isn't some epistemic claim about what's possible given what's known, 
but rather is a circumstantial claim. Given the circumstances that Joe is here in Berkeley 
it's impossible that he's in Boston. What motivates Sally to say "Joe may be in Boston" 
is an epistemic claim-for all she knows he's in Boston-but what Sally says is ambiguous 
between that epistemic claim and the circumstantial one you end up evaluating. 
A number of caveats are in order. First, one familiar with the literature will notice that 
I stay away from the word 'might' and use 'may,' e.g. 'Joe may be in Boston' instead of 'Joe 
might be in Boston.' This is because 'might' is the past of 'may,' although there does seem 
to be a tendency in colloquial talk to use them interchangeably or to use 'might' to express 
a sort of possibility weaker than 'may.' The reader is free to substitute 'might' where I use 
'may.' 
Second, I see this project as largely one of collecting observations. My goal is not to pin 
down specific truth conditions for the epistemic reading of utterances of the relevant sort. 
I hope to sketch, from the observations made, a picture of "epistemic modals" which can 
be carried across a number of semantic frameworks. If static possible world semantics are 
your thing, then probably what you want is the variant of von Fintel and Gillies' "cloudy 
contextualism" which allows for circumstantial readings to be put into play. But the picture 
sketched here could be filled out in the framework of a dynamic, updated-based semantics 
as well. 
Third, as this is a descriptive project there will inevitably be a good amount of disagree-
ment over what examples represent intuitively correct or common use. Most contemporary 
authors acknowledge the divergence in intuitions. I try to motivate most of the intuitions 
that I peddle by pointing to features of the examples which have not been discussed in the 
literature. Hopefully I convince you. 
A fourth and final point regards the prima facie plausibility of my main claim. The claim 
that the utterances in the problematic examples express circumstantial, and not epistemic, 
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modality may seem implausible. If it is correct, why have so few people even considered 
such a view?l But confusing circumstantial modals for epistemic modals is not difficult to 
do. Unlike most other modals the modal base of both epistemic and circumstantial modals 
consists of possible worlds consistent with some set of facts, as opposed to, e.g. some set 
of regulations (deontic), ends (teleologic), or laws (nomologic). The difference between the 
two lies in perspective. The modal base for epistemic modals consists of possible worlds 
consistent with facts that are known, while the modal base for circumstantial modals consists 
of possible worlds consistent with the circumstances (the facts that hold.) They end up 
looking similar because we generally assess both circumstantial and epistemic modals based 
on what is known of the circumstances-it's just that in the former case what delimits the 
modal base is the circumstances while in the later case it's what is known of them. 
A brief comment on notation. I use single quotes" to mark the use/mention distinction 
and double quotes "" either to mark utterances or as scare quotes, e.g. 'Joe may be in 
Boston' is a sentence and "Joe may be in Boston" is an utterance of that sentence. In 
hindsight I ought to have used an abbreviation such as IMM for 'indicative mood modal.' 
1 As far as I know, myself, John Hawthorne (2007) and Alan White (1975) are the only three people to 
propose that these utterances have non-epistemic readings. 
2 History and Background 
G.E. Moore was the first philosopher to note that there is a common reading of modals 
in English which does not express logical, sometimes called alethic, possibility. (Moore, 
1959; 1962) Moore called this use epistemic, since he thought that 'It's possible that cp' is 
semantically equivalent to 'It's not certain that not cp.' (1962, 184) Ian Hacking brought 
substantial attention to this use by showing in his paper "Possibility" (1967) that this se-
mantic analysis could not be correct. In a series of papers Hacking, Paul Teller and Keith 
DeRose developed an account of the semantics of this use which Kai von Fintel calls the 
"canon," or which is usually just called contextualism.1 (Hacking, 1967; 1975; Teller, 1972; 
DeRose, 1991) More recently John MacFarlane and Andy Egan, among others, have argued 
that the way in which epistemic modal claims are evaluated is not consistent with contex-
tualism as developed by Hacking et al' or any reasonable variant thereof. (MacFarlane, 
2011; Egan, 2007; Egan et al., 2005; Stephenson, 2007) 
In this section I review the literature by Hacking, Teller and DeRose, set out the prob-
lematic examples raised by MacFarlane and Egan, and summarize the contemporary debate 
over these problems. While much of the current literature on these examples centers around 
contextualism versus relativism as the proper semantic framework for "epistemic modals," 
my perspective here is of these examples as data for any semantic account of indicative 
mood modal sentences-a technical grammatical notion to be made precise in 2.1.2.2 As I 
shall argue over the course of this thesis, both contextualism and relativism fail to account 
for these examples because, in fact, these examples are cases where the indicative mood 
modal is not straightforwardly epistemic. 
1 Reading my thesis-and much of the current literature--one may think that "classical" contextualism, as 
opposed to the "cloudy" contextualism of von Fintel and Gillies, is dead. Michael Huemer is one contem-
porary "classical" contextualist. (Huemer, 2007) John Hawthorne, once a relativist, also seems sympathetic 
to classical contextualism. 
2Here 'epistemic modal' is in scare quotes because, as I discuss in section 3.1.3, what the current literature 
means by it is not what was meant by Hacking et al., nor what I mean when, in line with definition 2.1.5.1, 
I speak of epistemic modals. 
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2.1 Non-Logical Possibility 
2.1.1 Moore's Observation Moore, and then Hacking, both made observations about 
certain readings of certain grammatical constructions involving 'possible' in English which 
show that modal sentences do not always express logical possibility. Moore makes two 
observations about sentences similar in form to 'It is possible that I am sitting now,' or 
synonymous sentences involving 'may,' e.g. 'I may be sitting now.'3 The first is that 
someone who knew that he is not sitting now would speak falsely if he made such a claim, 
at least on some readings of the utterance. Second, someone-speaking to a group of 
people including one who knew the speaker was not sitting-would also speak falsely if he 
made such a claim-at least on some readings, as before.4 This, Moore says, is different 
from sentences similar in form to 'It is possible that I should have been sitting now,' or 
synonymous sentences involving 'might have been,' e.g. 'I might have been sitting now.' 
These sentences could truthfully be asserted by someone who knew he was not sitting, or by 
someone speaking to a group of people including one who knew the speaker was not sitting. 
In his posthumously published private notes, Commonplace Book 1919-1953, we find 
the example just given: 
I may go out this evening = I don't know that I shan't nor yet that I shall = 
It's possible I shall, but also possible I shan't. What proves that this doesn't 
mean merely: That I shall go out this evening is not a self-contrad. prop.? The 
proof is that where a prop. is not self-contradictory, I often know it's false: e.g. 
that I'm not sitting down. If anyone says: It's just possible that you're not; 
it's right to answer: No, there's no chance that I'm not; I know I am. But: it's 
possible that I should not have been sitting now-I might not, is compatible 
with I know I am. (Moore, 1962, 184-5) 
Other comments to similar effect are found in his 1941 Howison lecture at the University 
of California, published (1959). While discussing arguments for skepticism of the form 'cp 
is contingently true; therefore, it is possible that not cp,' he says: 
3Whether or not these really are synonymous is taken up in section 3.1.2. The upshot is that they seem to 
have readings on which they are synonymous and readings on which they aren't. 
4As will be discussed below, at least at some places in their writing both Moore and Hacking suggest that 
there is only one reading of sentences similar in form to 'It is possible that I am sitting now.' I have added 
the caveats because it seems that these sentences often have readings different from the one Moore and 
Hacking discuss. 
To take, for instance, again, the proposition that I was then standing up: from 
the fact that this proposition was contingent, it does not follow that, if I had said 
'It is possible that it is not the case that I am standing up,' I should have been 
saying something true. That this is so follows from my former contention that 
the contingency of the proposition in question does not entail that it was not 
known to be true, because one, at least, of the ways in which we use expressions 
of the form 'It is possible that p' is such that the statement in question cannot 
be true if the person who makes it knows for certain that p is false. We very, 
very often use expressions of the form 'It is possible that p' in such a way that 
by using such an expression we are making an assertion of our own ignorance 
on a certain point. (Moore, 1959, 232) 
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In addition to this observation, Moore suggests a few other features of modal sentences of 
this form. Among these, he suggests that the sentence 'I know not rp' is incompatible with 
'It is possible that rp'. (Moore, 1962, 187) But 'I know not rp' is not incompatible with 'It 
is possible that rp' independent of to whom 'I' refers. He also says that 'It is possible that 
rp' is semantically equivalent to 'It's not certain that not rp,' (1962, 184), while saying that 
'I know not rp' does not always contradict 'It is not certain that not rp,' since, e.g. it seems 
that someone speaking to a group of people could truly say "It's not certain that Moore is 
still alive" even though Moore might well know he is alive. (Moore, 1962, 278) 
Although imprecise, the following definition is a convenient label. It will be amended 
below.5 
Definition 2.1.1.1. A modal sentence with rp as its prejacent is MOO'T-ean if and only if it 
would be incompatible with "J know that not rp," spoken by at least some other individuals. 
Thus we might say that Moore's observation is that at least some modal sentences have 
readings on which they are Moorean. 
Hacking, it seems, makes similar remarks. He says, 
Evidently not all logical possibilities are possible. It is not possible that there 
are two hundred armchairs in my room as I write these notes, for I am sitting 
here in these cramped quarters and can see perfectly well that there are only 
three or four chairs altogether. It would be absurd to say to someone, as if I 
meant it, that there may be two hundred chairs in this room: not only absurd, 
but also false. It would be equally silly to say that it is possible that there are 
5The required amendment is that it is utterances of modal sentences which are either Moorean or not. This 
is because the same modal sentence can have different readings which are expressed in different contexts and 
one reading may be so contradicted while another not. 
two hundred---or even a dozen-armchairs in my room as I write these words. 
We have a logically possible state of affairs that is not possible. (Hacking, 
1967, 145-146) 
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I take it that both Moore and Hacking's observations are descriptive and not normative: 
there is a way in which we speak of things as being "possible," in English, which does not 
have the truth conditions which we expect from logical possibility.6 Moore, as mentioned 
above, suggests truth conditions for this type of possibility: <p is possible, in this sense, if 
and only if <p is not known to be false by anyone in some group relevant to the assertion. 
Before discussing Hacking's famous critique of this account and the ensuing papers by 
Teller and DeRose it is worth discussing just which sentences have readings on which they 
are Moorean. 
2.1.2 Indicative Mood Modal Constructions For the moment it is convenient to 
ignore the complications which arise from there being alternative, non-Moorean readings of 
'It is possible <p' and similar sentences. The comments above suggest that such sentences 
where <p is in the indicative mood or synonymous sentences of the form may( <p) involving 
'may' are Moorean, while those where <p is in the subjunctive mood or synonymous sentences 
involving 'might have been' are not and express logical possibility. But even putting aside 
the complication that such sentences have different readings, not every sentence of the form 
'It is possible <p' where <p is in the indicative mood is Moorean, and not every sentence where 
<p is in the subjunctive mood expresses logical possibility. Things are further complicated 
when <p is not in the present tense. 
To see the first point, consider the following example from Teller. (Teller, 1972, 306) 
Contrast: 
(1) It is possible for me to take all my clothes off before your very eyes. 
(2) It is possible that I will take my clothes off before your very eyes. 
On their usual readings, Teller suggests, (1) could be true while (2) is false. If spoken by 
Teller, (1) would be consistent with his knowledge that he will not remove his clothes-and 
6 As Josh Brown has suggested to me in conversation, it is not clear that Moore himself was trying to 
describe the common use of possible-that constructions as opposed to giving a prescriptive, Russellian 
"logical analysis." Here I stay away from exegesis of Moore's text. The comments on Moore which follow 
are an attempt to fit Moore's work into the broader work on "epistemic modals" which followed. 
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hence is not Moorean-while (2) would be inconsistent with that knowledge-and hence is 
Moorean. 
To see the second point, consider the following example, taken from Hacking. (Hacking, 
1967, 147) 
(3) It is possible that the ballot box were rifled. (It is possible that the ballot box should 
have been rifled.) 7 
(4) It is possible that the ballot box was rifled. 
Note that (4) has the prejacent in the indicative mood and seems to be Moorean-it suggests 
that the election was rigged and someone who knew that it was not could contradict the 
claim. But (3), though having the prejacent in the subjunctive mood, does not seem to 
express logical possibility but rather in contrast to (4) suggests that the election procedures 
where not such as to prevent the election from being rigged. 
Finally, consider the synonymous 'may' construction to (4). The prejacent of (4) is 'The 
ballot box was rifled,' a clause in the past tense. The corresponding 'may' construction 
also needs to be in the past tense, so here the corresponding 'may' construction is 'The 
ballot box might have been rifled.' Thus not all modals of the form 'might have been' 
are non-Moorean, since a prejacent in the past tense will force this particular grammatical 
construction. But also note that that is the corresponding 'might have been' construction 
for (3). Hence modal constructions may(cp) with the prejacent cp in the past tense can 
be ambiguous between synonymous possible-that constructions: e.g. 'The ballot box might 
have been rifled' could be read as either (3) or (4). Unless otherwise stated, all such may(cp) 
constructions below are intended to be read similarly to (4). 
Some other examples drawn from the literature suggest that this pattern is fairly stable: 
(5) It is possible that John be in Boston. (It is possible that John should have been in 
Boston.) 
(6) It is possible that John is in Boston. 
(7) It is possible that he be blind now. (It is possible that he should have been blind by 
now.) 
7 As I have done here, in cases where the subjunctive mood feels archaic in the present tense I put a presumably 
synonymous variant with helping verbs in parentheses. 
(8) It is possible that he is blind now. 
(9) It is possible that the kettle should have boiled dry in five minutes. 
(10) It is possible for the kettle to boil dry in five minutes. 
(11) It is possible for sand to wear down a mountain. 
(12) It is possible for him to be a woodsman. 
(13) It is possible for the judge to give the woman a suspended sentence. 
(14) It is possible that the judge will give the woman a suspended sentence. 
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Those sentences which have the form 'It is possible that <p' where <p is in the indicative mood 
seem to have readings which are Moorean, while those where <p is in the subjunctive mood 
or which have the form 'It is possible for x to P' never have readings which are Moorean. 
This suggests the following grammatical class of sentences. 
Definition 2.1.2.1. A sentence is an indicative mood modal construction if and only 
if it is of the form 'It is possible that <p' with <p in the indicative mood, is a synonymous 
sentence involving 'may,' or a sentence synonymous to one of these two forms. 
It seems then that indicative mood modal constructions tend to express modal propositions 
which are false if their prejacent is known to be false. Moore thought that the truth 
conditions for these sentences were fairly simple, that indicative mood modal constructions 
express propositions which are true if their prejacent is not known to be false. As the next 
examples show this is not the case. 
2.1.3 The Development of Contextualism Let <p be an indicative mood modal 
construction with prejacent 'lj.;, e.g. r.p is 'It is possible that 'lj.;.' As the wording of definition 
2.1.1.1 suggests, whether or not <p is Moorean depends on the proposition expressed by <po If 
r.p expresses different propositions in different contexts of utterance, then some instances of 
<p may be Moorean while other instances of <p may not be. For example, in those cases where 
'The ballot box might have been rifled' is read as (4) the utterance will be Moorean, while 
those where it is read as (3) will not be. The topic of this section is the truth conditions of 
Moorean (instances of) indicative mood modal constructions. 
Let us say that someone utters <p, and assume the utterance is Moorean. What are the 
truth conditions for <p? That the utterance of <p is Moorean implies at least a necessary 
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condition on the truth of the utterance of 'P, namely that 'ljJ is not known to be false. But 
known to be false by whom? One suggestion is that 'ljJ cannot be known to be false by 
the speaker, but as Moore's initial observation shows the knowledge of other conversation 
partners is often relevant. Consider an example suggested by Moore: 
Example 2.1.3.1. Moore's Example. (1962, 186) It's 1945 and Berlin has just fallen 
to the Soviets. Some Soviet infantry are searching for high ranking Nazi officers when one 
says, 
(15) Soldier: Hitler may be alive. 
If one of his compatriots had recently been briefed that Hitler had been found dead, the 
original utterance would be false and the compatriot right to say, 
(16) Compatriot: No, we just found him dead in his bunker a few hours ago. o 
But on the other hand, it's not that 'ljJ cannot be known by anyone, for in the example 
Hitler himself would know, if he were still alive, that he is but this, in the context of the 
infantry man's utterance, would not make the utterance false--or at least, Moore suggests 
as much. The compatriot, for example, would certainly not consider what Hitler himself 
or those Germans around him potentially know about his status when evaluating the truth 
of (15). This suggests that for each utterance of an indicative mood modal there is some 
group of people whose knowledge is relevant to the truth of the of the assertion and that 
the members of this group are determined by the context of utterance. Thus the necessary 
condition can be put: a Moorean utterance of'P is true only if'ljJ is not known to be false 
by anyone in the contextually determined group. 
A natural suggestion is that this condition is sufficient as well: if no one in the group 
determined by the context of utterance knows that 'ljJ is false, then the proposition expressed 
by that utterance of 'P is true. 
Definition 2.1.3.2. Moore's Condition. A Moorean utterance of an indicative mood 
modal construction 'P with prejacent 'ljJ is true if and only if no one in the group determined 
by the context of utterance knows that 'ljJ is false. 8 
8This definition, and the three that follow from Hacking, Teller and DeRose should be read with the qual-
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Moore himself seems to suggest this when he says that epistemic possibility is "the sense in 
which 'It's possible that cp'='It's not certain that not cp'," (Moore, 1962, 184), since in his 
paper "Certainty" (1959) he says that 'It's certain that cp' is true if and only if at least one 
person in the relevant group knows that cpo (1959, 250-251) 
Hacking showed that this analysis could not be correct by considering several examples 
of Moorean utterances of indicative mood modal constructionsY His most famous example 
involves incompetent maritime salvage workers: 
Example 2.1.3.3. The Salvage Worker. (Hacking, 1967, 148) There is a salvage crew 
searching for a sunken ship. The mate of the salvage ship, after looking through an old log 
and making some erroneous calculations, says, 
(17) Mate: It's possible that the wreck is in these waters. 
But if after the fact, when no wreck is found in those waters, the captain examines the log 
and sees that the ship was nowhere near that location it seems he would rightly say, 
(18) Captain: The wreck couldn't have been here! 
Indeed; it seems that the mate said something false in uttering (17), although the falsehood 
did not arise from what anyone actually knew at the time. D 
One could suggest that this example is best explained by saying that it is not the information 
contained in the log which makes the mate's utterance false but rather that after the fact 
he or his fellow crew come to know the information in the log. (Thus it is their later 
knowledge of not 'ljJ that leads us and them to evaluate the mate's utterance as false.) But 
this explanation runs aground on two points. First, it seems that even if the example is 
run so that neither the mate nor any of his fellow crew come to know anything else about 
the wreck the mate will still have spoken falsely.lo Thus the falsity of the utterance does 
not seem to depend on anyone knowing anything. Second, it is not true that in general 
ification "A Moorean utterance of an indicative mood modal construction cp with prejacent 1/J is true on 
the particular reading we have in mind ... " since as I argue there are readings of Moorean utterances of 
indicative mood modals different from the epistemic reading. 
9 As I argue in section 3.2.1, neither The Salvage Worker nor the lottery examples are relevant to the truth 
conditions of the epistemic reading, since the modal utterances in these examples do not express the epistemic 
reading. 
lOThis point is very similar to what I call "Hacking's observation," see section 3.2.1. 
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we evaluate indicative mood modal claims based on our present information. Consider 
Hacking's second and third examples: 
Example 2.1.3.4. The Fair and Crooked Lotteries. (Hacking, 1967, 148-149) Say 
that Fred buys a lottery ticket. Fred's pessimistic friend remarks at the time, 
(19) Fred's Friend: You may win, but you probably won't. 
As expected, Fred loses. But it is unnatural to say, in hindsight, that Fred's friend spoke 
falsely or that Fred couldn't have won. Fred's friend spoke truly. To see this, consider a 
contrast case where the friend's utterance is definitely false. Imagine in this case that the 
lottery is rigged so that only the proprietors can win. In this case if Fred's friend says, 
(20) Fred's friend: You may win, but you probably won't. 
it seems natural to say that he's wrong; not only will Fred probably lose, it's not possible 
for him to win. D 
Given these considerations, Hacking suggests that the crucial aspect to the Salvage Worker 
and Crooked Lottery examples which makes the respective utterances false is that a prac-
ticable investigation would have established that the prejacents are false. The mate could 
have more carefully reviewed the log and Fred's friend could have looked into the lottery.ll 
Thus Hacking suggests the following truth conditions: 
Definition 2.1.3.5. Hacking's Condition. A Moorean utterance of an indicative mood 
modal construction <p with prejacent 'ljJ is true if and only if no one in the group determined 
by the context of utterance knows that 'ljJ is false, nor would any practicable investigations 
(by those in the group) establish that it is false. (Hacking, 1967, 149,153) 
Of course, this definition is incomplete in several respects. Like Moore's condition, the 
definition does not say anything about how the group of relevant people is established by 
llIt's not clear in what sense there's a "practicable" investigation which would have lead Fred's friend to 
discover that the lottery was rigged. Usually such things aren't very practicable. Josh Brown has suggested 
that this could be fixed by stipulating that there is in fact a practicable way for Fred's friend to come to 
know that the lottery is rigged, perhaps if its proprietors are known thieves. But a more important point, to 
be taken up in section 3.1.2, is that it can be hard to hear Fred's friend's utterance as expressing something 
about what's known. When the prejacent is in the future tense there are often non-epistemic readings of 
the modal which are more natural than the epistemic one. Doesn't "You may win the lottery" just say that 
Fred's ticket has a non-zero chance of being picked? 
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the context. But a second problem now is the notion of a "practicable investigation." Just 
which investigations count as practicable? "Practicable" is also a modal notion, so one may 
also worry that this definition is circular. Hacking argues though that it is not, saying that 
the modality involved in "practicable" is the sort expressed by possible-for constructions-
i.e. which investigations are practicable are those that are possible for someone to do, in 
some sense. Thus the definition is not viciously circular, since we are trying to give an 
account of possible-that constructions or, more broadly, indicative mood modals. 
Teller provides an example of an indicative mood modal which shows that no explication 
of "practicable" can lead to a correct definition, since it is a clear case where there is some 
practicable investigation that would establish the truth or falsity of the prejacent but where 
the modal claim is true. This next case shows the problem, while the following suggests a 
solution: 
Example 2.1.3.6. The Doting Grandmother. (Teller, 1972,307) An expectant father 
can truly say, 
(21) Expectant father: It is possible that my child will be a boy, and it is possible that my 
child will be a girl. 
despite the fact that there is a practicable test which will establish the child's sex. The 
availability of the test does not make the agonizing grandmother's utterance false when she 
says, 
(22) Doting Grandmother: It's possible it will be a boy, it's possible it will be a girl. Should 
I buy blue or pink? 0 
Example 2.1.3.7. Two Detectives. (Teller, 1972, 310) As Teller describes, "the well-
known detectives, Sleuth and Private Eye, have been assigned to investigate the murder of 
McRich. Their only suspect thus far is McRich's nephew, a sleezy character who figures 
prominently in the old man's will. Private Eye has been investigating the nephew's where-
abouts during the last 24 hours, and uncovers conclusive evidence that during the evening 
he was 10 miles from the scene of the crime. But the nephew's whereabouts in the morning 
remain unknown." Given this, it seems natural for Private Eye to say things like, 
(23) Private Eye: It's possible that the nephew is the murderer. 
15 
Teller continues, "meanwhile, Sleuth has been at the morgue establishing the exact time of 
death, and concludes that the crime must have been committed between the hours of seven 
and eight p.m." In view of this evidence it seems natural for Sleuth to say things like, 
(24) Sleuth: It's possible that the nephew is the murderer. 
But later, after the two detectives compare notes and realize that their combined evidence 
shows that the nephew is not the murder (he was 10 miles from the scene of the crime when 
McRich was killed) it seems natural for them to judge their previous assertions as false: 
(25) Private Eye: It wasn't possible that the nephew did it after all! D 
The key feature of this example, Teller suggests, is that in some sense the two detectives 
would have known the prejacent was false, if only they had put their knowledge together. 
This is what makes the modal claim false. Thus Teller suggests the following definition. 
Definition 2.1.3.8. Teller's Condition. A Moorean utterance of an indicative mood 
modal construction cp with prejacent 'lj; is true if and only if no one in the group determined 
by the context of utterance knows that 'lj; is false, nor is there a member, t, of the group 
such that if t were to know all the propositions known to those in the group, then he could, 
on the strength of this knowledge of these propositions as basis, data, or evidence, come to 
know that'lj; is false. (Teller, 1972, 310-311) 
Presumably Teller's definition gets The Salvage Worker example correct for the following 
reason. The wording of the example suggests that the mate knows all the important facts 
listed in the log book, but somehow just miscalculates. Presumably one of his fellow crew, 
if they had known the facts listed in the log book known to the mate, would have known 
the wreck could not be where the mate said it might be. 
As DeRose points out in (1991), a weakness of Teller's definition is that The Salvage 
Worker example is easily amendable so that the mate does not know all the important 
facts listed in the log book. The example can be run again so that the mate misread the 
important entries, or perhaps did not read them at all. In this case, if it is still true that 
the mate spoke falsely when he said that it's possible that the wreck is in such-and-such 
waters, then Teller's definition is incorrect. DeRose argues that the mate still would have 
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spoken falsely in this case, but also offers another example (Cancer Test B, below) where 
the prejacent is not known to be false on even the combined knowledge of the contextually 
determined group but where the indicative mood modal seems clearly false. The set up 
for the examples is that John has some symptoms indicative of cancer and has just had a 
"filtering" test which if "negative" conclusively rules out cancer, while if "positive" neither 
confirms nor rules out cancer. DeRose says, "We will suppose that, before the test is run, 
the doctor tells John and his family that there is a 30% chance that John has cancer and 
a 45% chance that the test will be positive." (DeRose, 1991, 582) 
Example 2.1.3.9. Cancer Test A. (DeRose, 1991, 582) DeRose continues, "John's doctor 
has received the results of the test, which are negative, but has not told anyone else what 
the results are. The hospital's policy is that the results of this test are given to the patient 
and his/her family only in person. When a doctor gets the results, he calls the patient and 
makes an appointment for the patient to come in for results. John's wife, Jane, has received 
the call, so she knows that the doctor knows the results of the test, but she does not know 
what the results are. John's estranged brother, Bill, who lives far away, but who has heard 
a rumor that John has cancer, calls Jane and says," 
(26) Bill: I've heard John has cancer. Is it true? 
It seems that one natural way for Jane to respond to Bill is to say, 
(27) Jane: It's possible that John has cancer. He has some of the symptoms. But it's by 
no means certain that he's got it. They've run a test on him which may rule cancer 
out, but they won't tell us the results of the test until tomorrow. 
But it also seems natural for John's doctor to say to another doctor something like, 
(28) It's impossible that John has cancer, so we should start planning tests for other dis-
eases. D 
DeRose notes that one may also suggest that an equally appropriate--or perhaps more 
appropriate-response from Jane to Bill is that she doesn't know whether or not it's possible 
that John has cancer. What is important for Teller's definition is that this response still 
seems appropriate when the example is modified slightly. 
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Example 2.1.3.10. Cancer Test B. (DeRose, 1991, 587) As DeRose says, "in this case, 
the test has been run, but not even the doctor knows the results of the test. A computer 
has calculated the results and printed them. A hospital employee has taken the printout 
and, without reading it, placed it in a sealed envelope. The policy of the hospital is that 
the patient should be the first to learn the results. Jane has made an appointment to pick 
up the results tomorrow. She knows that the envelope with the results has been generated 
and that nobody knows what the results are. Still, if Bill were to call her to find out the 
latest news, she might very well say," 
(29) Jane: I don't yet know whether it's possible that John as cancer. I'm going to find 
that out tomorrow when the results of the test are revealed. 0 
If Teller's definition were correct, then since no one knew that John didn't have cancer nor 
could anyone, if they knew what everyone else knew, come to know John didn't have cancer, 
Jane could have truthfully said that John may have cancer and should not have said that 
she didn't know whether it was possible he did. 
So Hacking's definition seems to count certain indicative mood modals as false which we 
intuitively count as true, while Teller's definition seems to count certain indicative mood 
modals as true which we intuitively count as false. DeRose attempts to take a middle 
ground between the positions by suggesting, in line with Hacking, that what can come to 
be known is important but only if the way in which it can come to be known is relevant 
to the context. Somehow then checking the log is relevant in the Salvage Worker case, but 
gender tests aren't relevant in the case of the Doting Grandmother. 12 Before giving truth 
conditions DeRose gives an explanation of the Cancer Test cases. In both A and B, it is 
appropriate for Jane to say it's possible that John has cancer if she is referring to what is 
possible, given what she and John know, while it is appropriate for Jane to say she doesn't 
know whether it's possible that John has cancer if she is referring to what is possible, given 
the larger epistemic state including the doctor's knowledge, the print out the test results, 
etc. (1991, 587-586,591-592) So DeRose amends Hacking and Teller's definitions as follows. 
12DeRose's observations are important not only because they show that Hacking and Teller's definitions are 
extensionally incorrect, but also because they show that Hacking and Teller's definitions are too rigid. There 
seem to be multiple correct ways for Jane to respond in the cancer test cases and the right truth conditions 
for indicative mood modals should reflect that flexibility. 
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Definition 2.1.3.11. DeRose's Condition. A Moorean utterance of an indicative mood 
modal construction cp with prejacent 'l/J is true if and only if no one in the group determined 
by the context of utterance knows that 'l/J is false, nor is there any relevant way by which 
members of the group can come to know that'l/J is false. (DeRose, 1991, 593-594) 
2.1.4 Comments on Contextualism Note that all four of the above definitions as-
sume that the truth of "It's possible that cp" is determined by what is known by some 
group of people determined by the context of utterance. The project though is descriptive; 
Hacking et al. are not trying to define some technical notion, but rather to describe the 
semantics of a commonly used locution of English--or at least one reading of this locution. 
The examples, insofar as they represent the way in which competent speakers use such 
locutions (use indicative mood modal constructions) show that "what is known by some 
group of people" cannot simply be, say, the union of everything known by all members 
of the group (d la Moore) or the distributed knowledge of the group (d la Teller,) if the 
definitions are to capture actual use. Thus Hacking and DeRose introduce the idea that 
"what is known by the group" also includes things that members of the group "can come to 
know" in some "relevant" way. This device is needed to better fit the definitions to the data 
at hand. Egan, in (2007), introduces the clever term 'epistemic reach' to capture things like 
practicable investigations and other ways of coming to know. What's in the epistemic reach 
of a group is what the group can come to know through relevant or practicable means. 
For the next definition, what is known by a group will be assumed to include (i) some 
appropriate amalgamation of what the members of the group know, e.g. the union of 
everything known by all members of the group or the distributed knowledge of the group 
and (ii) what's in the epistemic reach of the group. If cp is an indicative mood modal with 
prejacent 'l/J, then on the epistemic reading cp is true if and only if'l/J is not known to be 
false to the group determined by the context of utterance. Call this the basic contextualist 
scheme for indicative mood modals. Insofar as the above definitions do not specify how a 
group is associated with a context of utterance they are incomplete; and in fact one may 
worry that even after we use the technical device of "epistemic reach" to fit the data as best 
we can there will still be cases where the context of utterance fails to deliver a group-where 
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the context is indeterminate with respect to a group--or cases where the context is not only 
indeterminate between a number of groups but also where none of these potential groups 
delivers the use seen in the example.13 Such indeterminate contexts introduce ambiguity 
into the utterance, and in cases where none of the potential groups delivers the use that 
ambiguity is "unresolvable." 
For example, consider Cancer Test A and B. In A Jane says to Bill, "It's possible that 
John has cancer. He has some of the symptoms. But it's by no means certain that he's 
got it. They've run a test on him which may rule cancer out, but they won't tell us the 
results of the test until tomorrow." The last sentence 'They've run a test on him which 
may rule cancer out, but they won't tell us the results of the test until tomorrow,' viewed as 
part of the context in which the indicative mood modal 'It's possible that John has cancer' 
is uttered, seems to exclude the results of the test and the doctor's knowledge of them 
from the group relative to which the truth of the modal claim is evaluated. Likewise, the 
sentence 'I'm going to find that out tomorrow when the results of the test are revealed' in 
B seems to rule the results of the test into the group, explaining why Jane will not affirm 
that it's possible that John has cancer. But, we can imagine these cases run with a much 
less talkative Jane who forgets to include such qualificatory information. In these cases, 
DeRose says, what Jane says will be ambiguous and Bill would be right to ask just what 
Jane meant. Perhaps if Jane was less talkative and Bill had already heard that a filtering 
test had been run on John he would ask "What do you mean John may have cancer? Do 
you have the results yet?" (DeRose, 1991, 593) 
A final point worth noting is that the above discussion implicitly assumes that evalua-
tions of utterances of indicative mood modal constructions are consistent, or alternatively 
that the truth value of these utterances are fixed by the context of utterance. Consider 
13There are of course many other worries. For example, as discussed in section 3.2.1 and (von Fintel and 
Gillies, 2011), the project of fitting the data through the device of epistemic reach is a dubious one. Why 
is it within Fred's friend's epistemic reach to find out that the lottery is rigged, but not within the doting 
grandmother's reach to find out the sex of the child? DeRose proposes because the one is "relevant" and the 
other not, but what justifies that claim other than that it gets the examples right? There are other questions 
about the notion of "epistemic reach" raised by Bach in (2011). For example, are truths implied by what 
is directly known by the grown within the group's epistemic reach? Surely at least some of them seem to 
be. What about memory? Is information members of the group have forgotten within the group's epistemic 
reach? Although most in the literature set such questions aside, Michael Huemer is one contextualist who 
tries to sort through the consequences of cutting the basic contextualist scheme in different ways. (Huemer, 
2007) 
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Moore's example about Hitler. Assume that none of the infantry man's compatriots know 
that Hitler is dead-but of course, those Germans in the bunker do. It is natural to say 
that the group relevant to the truth of the Russian infantry man's utterance is the group of 
people involved in the conversation, or perhaps if the context was filled in more the Russian 
army itself. It certainly doesn't seem right to include the Germans in the bunker. If this is 
correct, and assuming that the Russians do not know that Hitler is dead, the utterance (15) 
"Hitler may be alive" is true on the basic contextualist scheme. Hence anyone who evaluates 
the claim-including those Germans in the bunker who know that Hitler is dead---should 
evaluate it as true, if they evaluate it correctly. Or consider Cancer Test A. If Jane spoke 
truly in uttering (27), then anyone who evaluates her utterance correctly should evaluate it 
as true, including the doctor who knows that John does not have cancer. 
2.1.5 Aside on Possible-World Semantics Much of the contemporary literature on 
epistemic modals in philosophy of language presupposes a possible-world semantics. 14 The 
idea is that modals are generalized quantifiers Q over sets of "possible worlds" and that 
an utterance of a modal sentence with prejacent cp expresses a proposition Q(B)(cp), where 
B, called the modal base, is the set of possible worlds being quantified over. With the 
introduction of possible worlds the truth of an utterance becomes relativized to a possible 
world, since in general we will need to assume that the modal base B associated with a 
sentence itself depends on a possible world of evaluation. (What is possible is not the same 
in every world.) Thus, assuming that the truth of cp itself only depends on the world of 
evaluation, the truth conditions for Q(B)(cp) are given as follows. 
(30) [Q(B)(cp)]W = true if and only if {w' E B(w) : [cp]W = true} E Q(B(w)) 
where, following the usual semantics for generalized quantifiers, Q(B(w)) is some subset of 
2B (w), the powerset of B(w). For example, 'possible,' 'may' and 'permissible' are associated 
with Q = 3, in which case 3(B(w)) = {X ~ B(w) : X #- 0}; while 'necessary,' 'must' and 
'ought' are associated with Q = V, in which case V(B(w)) = {B(w)}. 
14Most of this section-its examples, ideas, etc-is well known material drawn from the presentation in (von 
Fintel, 2006; von Fintel and Gillies, 2008a; Goldblatt, 2006). As von Fintel and Gillies report, these canonical 
semantics were first proposed by Kratzer (Kratzer, 1977; 1978; 1981; 1991) and based on the work of 
Kripke (1963) and Hintikka (1962). 
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If the basic contextualist scheme is to be fitted into this framework, then an utterance of 
a Moorean indicative mood modal will express some modal proposition Q(B)(cp), where the 
modal base B is the set of all possible worlds compatible with what is known to the group 
determined by the context of utterance. This presents two problems: first an additional 
parameter for a context of utterance must be added, and second a way of writing down 
"what is known to the group" in terms of a modal base must be found. For the first 
problem it is simply assumed that B depends also on the context of utterance, cu, i.e. 
B = B(w,cu). But, any given contextualist proposal for "what is known to the group" may 
present difficulties for writing down a modal base. For example, if Gc is the group picked 
out by context c and fx(w) is the set of worlds compatible with what x knows in world w, 
Moore's condition (2.1.3.2) is naturally written down as 
(31) [Q(B)(cp)]W,cu = true if and only if \Ix E Gcu : 3w' E fx(w) s.t. [cp]W,cu = true 
but there is no straightforward way to rewrite this in terms of a modal base B.15 As von 
Fintel and Gillies describe in (2011), we can do a bit better, in any case, with Teller's 
condition (2.1.3.8), which assuming that the prejacent itself is not a modal sentence can be 
safely written as 
(32) [Q(B)(cp)]W,Cu = true if and only if 3w' E n fx(w) s.t. [cp]W,cu = true 
xEGcu 
This suggests that B(w, c) = nxEGc fx(w), where Gc is the group picked out by the context 
c, is the modal base corresponding to Teller's condition. 
The project of giving formal semantics for Moorean utterances of indicative mood modals 
is not directly relevant though to the questions I wish to address here. As suggested above, 
it is unclear that all potential truth conditions fit into Kratzer's general scheme (30). One 
could also deny that this sort of possible world semantics were even appropriate at all, 
and suggest instead that a dynamic update-based possible world semantics were better 
suited. 16 Nevertheless this framework has three not wholly unrelated advantages. First it is 
convenient for expository purposes, second it allows for a unified treatment of modality and 
lastly it gives a convenient definition of modal flavor, i.e. for different types of possibility. 17 
15Here I'm borrowing the notation from (von Fintel and Gillies, 2011). 
16Egan takes this approach in (2007), as do some working at Amsterdam on the topic. 
17'Flavor' is the term used by von Fintel and Gillies. 
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Presumably Moorean utterances of indicative mood modals have been called "epistemic" 
because (it is thought) their truth conditions have something to do with what is known. 
Such modal utterances express something about what's possible, given what is known. (The 
question in the literature has been: given what is known by whom?) Likewise, we say that 
an utterance of a modal sentence is "logical" or "alethic" when it's truth conditions have 
something to do with consistency. Such modal utterances express something about what's 
possible, given the laws of logic. The above framework gives us a way to put the matter: 
an utterance of a modal sentence that expresses a proposition Q(B)(cp) is epistemic if and 
only if the modal base B was picked out by the context as the set of worlds compatible with 
some epistemic state, or what is known. 18 Likewise, if B is picked out by the context of 
utterance as just those worlds consistent with the laws of logic, the utterance is alethic. If 
B is picked out by the context as the set of just those worlds consistent with some set of 
rules or regulations, the utterance is deontic. In similar fashion we could define nomological, 
circumstantial, teleological and bouletic modals, among others. We then call this the flavor 
of the modal, or say that the modal expresses such-and-such type of possibility. If one likes 
collecting definitions, we could say, 
Definition 2.1.5.1. An uttemnce of a modal sentence which expresses Q(B)(cp) is epis-
temie if and only if B is picked out by the context of uttemnce as the set of worlds consisting 
of just those compatible with some epistemic state. 19 
2.2 The Problem: Unresolvable Ambiguity and Inconsistent Evaluations 
2.2.1 Examples The project at hand is the descriptive project of giving truth condi-
tions for indicative mood modal constructions which account for their use-the conditions 
under which speakers will assert them, evaluate utterances of them as true, etc. The 
examples in 2.1.3 show that the device of "epistemic reach" is needed to fit the general 
contextualist scheme to the data. A recent slew of examples though suggest that not all 
1BNote the intentionality, it is not just that B is a set of worlds which is compatible with some epistemic state, 
but rather we require that the context have specified B intentionally by picking it out as the set of worlds 
compatible with some epistemic state. The former version would make the notion of epistemic modality 
trivial, since plausibly every set of worlds B is the set of just those worlds compatible with some epistemic 
state. 
19Presumably in some cases the sentence is explicit, e.g. "For all I know, Joe may be in Boston." In this case 
we can just think of the restricting clause 'For all I know' as part of the context. 
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cases can be fit into the general scheme, even given this device. These examples fall into 
two main kinds: those involving unresolvable ambiguity from an indeterminate context and 
those involving inconsistent evaluations. 
To see what is meant by an "unresolvable ambiguity," consider the following example, 
based on one from John MacFarlane. 
Example 2.2.1.1. The Boston Case A. (MacFarlane, 2011, 4-5) George, Sally and Ed 
are talking in the coffee line. Joe, another regular in the coffee line, is conspicuously absent 
today. 
(33) Ed: I wonder where Joe is today. 
(34) Sally: He may be in Boston. 
(35) George: No, he can't be in Boston. I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley. D 
With regard to fixing a modal base B the context is indeterminate. (For example, Sally 
could have prefaced her utterance with 'For all I know,' fixing her own epistemic state.) 
The problem though is that there doesn't seem to be any modal base B that makes sense of 
all the responses. Consider the modal base associated with the group containing just Sally, 
call it Bs. On this reading Sally's utterance (34) would be true, and hence appropriate, but 
George would be wrong in denying Sally's assertion. Not only would he be wrong, but his 
response would be inappropriate: George does not know what Sally knows, and so cannot 
judge the truth of (34). But, on any modal base associated with a group containing George, 
e.g. Bg the worlds compatible with what George knows or Bg+s the worlds compatible with 
what the group consisting of George and Sally knows, Sally's utterance (34) is not only false, 
but seems inappropriate as well.2o Just as in The Cancer Test example when Jane defers 
saying whether or not it's possible that John has cancer because she does not know the 
result of the test (and hence doesn't know B), it seems that Sally too should defer until she 
knows what everyone else in the group relevant to B knows. But both George and Sally's 
assertions seem appropriate, so evidently not only is the context indeterminate, but there 
is no modal base B which could resolve the ambiguity in (34) introduced by the contextual 
20 It could be suggested that George and Sally do have a good idea about what the other knows, say if they 
were good friends. But since the same responses seem perfectly natural even if George and Sally do not have 
a good idea about what the other knows we are left with the same dilemma. 
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indeterminacy. That is, there seems to be several salient modal bases which are compatible 
with the context of utterance: 8 s , 8 g and 8 g+s . Sally's utterance (34) is ambiguous in 
the sense that anyone of the following readings would be compatible with the context of 
utterance21 
:3(8s )(Joe is in Boston) 
:3(8g )(Joe is in Boston) 
:3(8g+s )(Joe is in Boston) 
This "ambiguity" is unresolvable in the sense that none of these readings makes sense of 
the conversation. 
Although cases of unresolvable ambiguities provide one problem for the basic contex-
tualist scheme, a closely related but perhaps more acute problem is the one caused by 
inconsistent evaluations. Both MacFarlane (2011, 4) and Egan (Egan, 2007, 2-3) motivate 
their relativistic semantics on such cases.22 
Example 2.2.1.2. The Boston Case B. (MacFarlane, 2011, 4-5) George, Sally and Ed 
are talking in the coffee line. Again Joe is conspicuously absent today, but none of them 
knows that Joe isn't in Boston. 
(36) Ed: I wonder where Joe is today. 
(37) Sally: He may be in Boston. 
Now say that you were in the coffee line too and overheard the conversation. You think to 
yourself, "Joe can't be in Boston; I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley." (Or rather 
ask yourself. You just saw that Joe is here in Berkeley and not in Boston. Did Sally speak 
falsely?) o 
Example 2.2.1.3. Bond in Zurich. (Egan, 2007) James Bond recently infiltrated SPEC-
TRE's secret base in the Swiss Alps, where he planted a bug in the conference room. (Earlier 
in the day he left persuasive but misleading evidence of his presence in Zurich.) Back at 
MI6 and monitoring the bug, Bond and Leiter overhear the following conversation. 
21 And, as I shall argue, there are a number of other readings which are compatible with the context some 
which having non-epistemic flavors. 
22MacFariane calls these cases of third-party assessment. 
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(38) Number 2: Bond may be in Zurich. 
(39) Blofeld: You're right, I want you to go and search for him. 
But now imagine if Leiter, overhearing Number 2 utter (38), turned to Bond and said 
"That's right" or "That's right, you may be in Zurich." While Blofeld's reply seems appro-
priate, such a response from Leiter does not seem to be. o 
The idea in The Boston Case B is that when you think to yourself, "Joe can't be in 
Boston; I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley," it is an appropriate thought or 
reaction to Sally's utterance (37), given your knowledge that Joe isn't in Boston. Likewise, 
although it may be stilted, it would be appropriate or justified for Leiter, upon overhearing 
Number 2 utter (38), to say "That's false." Indeed, the point was to mislead Number 2 and 
Blofeld so they wrongly thought that Bond might be in Zurich. But also note that just as 
Blofeld's response in the Bond in Zurich example is appropriate, so an affirmation of Sally's 
utterance (37) by George or Ed would be as well. Thus three problems arise. First, ignoring 
the implausibility that the context of Number 2's utterance picks out Leiter as part of the 
group relevant to the modal base B of (38), both Number 2's utterance (38) and Leiter's 
response that (38) is false seem appropriate, and hence we generate the same unresolvable 
ambiguity that we saw in The Boston Case A. Second, each of (38), Blofeld's response and 
Leiter's response are appropriate, but Blofeld and Leiter seem to be disagreeing with each 
other. Third, there does not seem to be a consistent standard of evaluation in the Bond 
in Zurich example. Both Blofeld and Leiter, most plausibly, are evaluating Number 2's 
utterance (38) based on their own knowledge and not based on some common epistemic 
state fixed by the context. 
These last two points are important. Unresolvable ambiguity is a problem for contex-
tualism because in these cases there apparently is no epistemic state for the context to 
pick out. But cases where there is also inconsistent evaluations provide a further diffi-
culty. To see the difficulty consider one way the contextualist could respond to the The 
Boston Case A. One could suggest that Sally's utterance (34) and George's response (35) 
are actually affirming and denying different propositions. Sally, essentially, is affirming the 
proposition 3(Bs)(Joe is in Boston) while George is denying 3(Bg)(Joe is in Boston). But 
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in The Boston Case B and the Bond in Zurich example it feels as if there is disagreement 
between the kibitzer's evaluation and the conversation partner's evaluation.23 Presumably 
they are disagreeing over the truth value of the proposition expressed by the speaker. If 
the contextualist tries to avoid the problem in these cases by positing that the kibitzer and 
conversation partners are evaluating different claims then the disagreement is lost. Part of 
accounting for inconsistent evaluation cases is accounting for the feeling of disagreement, 
and the contextualist move to deal with simple cases of unresolvable ambiguity will fail 
to account for this disagreement when the case of unresolvable ambiguity also involves 
inconsistent evaluations. 24 
It seems that exactly analogous remarks can be made for The Boston Case B. The 
essential feature that these cases show is that people often seem to evaluate utterances 
of Moorean indicative mood modals based on their own knowledge, not based on some 
epistemic state picked out by the context of utterance. 
In explicating the problem for contextualism caused by the above examples certain 
utterances were characterized as "appropriate." For example, in The Boston Case A both 
Sally's utterance "He may be in Boston" and George's reply "No, he can't be in Boston" 
were called appropriate. What I mean when I say that an utterance is appropriate is 
that it is something that a competent speaker could say. An utterance, in the context 
of a conversation, would be inappropriate, in this sense, if the utterance suggests that 
the utterer is linguistically incompetent, i.e. does not understand what has been said.25 
230f course, there also seems to be some disagreement in The Boston Case A if we assume that Sally 
and George are in fact talking about the same proposition, since Sally evaluates her own claim as true, 
presumably. Pushing the issue of disagreement off until the Kibitzer cases, I hope, is a rhetorical move which 
makes the problem more salient: presumably both the conversation partner and kibitzer are evaluating the 
same proposition, namely the one expressed by the speaker's utterance. The point just is that we can 
get inconsistent evaluations in examples without kibitzers, but kibitzers seem to provide clear cases of 
inconsistent evaluations. 
24It seems that Michael Huemer, a contemporary contextualist who advocates for a position more or less in 
line with Hacking et al., tries to deal with unresolvable ambiguity in just this way. He sets out an example 
with unresolvable ambiguity and points out that there is no epistemic modal base which makes sense of all 
the utterances and saves the disagreement. He seems to conclude that there really isn't any disagreement, or 
that the third-party evaluator cannot correctly evaluate what the speaker said as false. (Huemer, 2007, 137-
140) The problem with this response is just that it ignores the data. These cases are supposed to be so 
difficult precisely because there's no epistemic modal base which makes sense of the responses and saves the 
disagreement, but it seems like there is disagreement. The third-party evaluator really can, in full linguistic 
competence, deny what the speaker said. 
250ften times I will refer to the evaluation expressed by an utterance itself as appropriate or inappropriate 
according to whether or not the utterance itself was appropriate or inappropriate. 
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For example, saying "No, there's a chance he isn't in Boston" would be an inappropriate 
response to "Joe may be in Boston." Such a response clearly shows a misunderstanding of 
the word 'may.' Appropriate things can sound unnatural. This will happen when someone 
says something appropriate but unpragmatic, something which is permissible but which 
fails to advance the conversation.26 It should be noted that whether or not an utterance is 
appropriate is a matter of linguistic intuition: for example, judging the appropriateness of 
George's reply to Sally in The Boston Case A involves an intuition about whether he can 
say what he does and still be counted a competent speaker or as understanding what was 
said. 
The point just is that someone can say something quirky or out of place without dis-
playing a lack of linguistic understanding, while someone can also speak correctly or with 
semantic competence while being quirky. Saying something appropriate but unnatural is 
to be "nit-picky," "difficult" or an uncooperative conversation partner. The distinction is 
important because when considering examples such The Boston Cases what is important is 
that the utterances-both the original assertion and the responses-be appropriate, even if 
unnatural. The goal, after all, is a semantic theory and not a pragmatic one. 
2.2.2 Responses to the Examples There have been various responses to the cases 
which take the above examples more or less at face value and reject the basic contextualist 
scheme. The main response is the one proposed by MacFarlane and Egan, usually dubbed 
relativism. (MacFarlane, 2011; Egan, 2007; Egan et al., 2005; Stephenson, 2007) The 
relativist proposal, in rough form, is that we should take seriously the observation that 
there seems to be different standards of evaluation operative in the examples. Sally utters 
(37), George evaluates it with respect to what he knows and comes up with "true!" while 
you, the kibitzer, evaluate it with respect to what you know and come up with "false!" A 
natural suggestion is that Sally's utterance (37) itself is true or false relative to a context 
of evaluation. Alternatively but equivalently we could say that the sentence' Joe may be in 
Boston' is true or false not relative to a context of utterance, but instead relative to a context 
26Casey O'Callaghan suggested this way putting the concept of appropriateness to me. Others in the con-
temporary literature use the adjective 'appropriate' to describe utterances. (Egan, 2007; MacFarlane, 2011) 
It is unclear whether they have in mind the same sense of appropriateness I do. Egan and MacFarlane take 
appropriateness to be something which usually only holds of utterances in the case when the utterer has 
good reasons to believe that the utterance is true. This much anyway seems to accord with my usage. 
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of evaluation. For the relativist, 'Joe may be in Boston' has the form 3(B)(Joe is in Boston), 
but where the contextualist contends that the modal base B is a function of worlds and 
contexts of utterance, i.e. B = B( w, cu), the relativist contends that the modal base B is a 
function of worlds and contexts of evaluation, i.e. B = B(w, CE).27 When Sally utters "Joe 
may be in Boston" what she is expressing is a modal claim the truth of which is relative to 
the person who evaluates it. Sally is justified in making the claim because, relative to her, 
it is true. You the kibitzer are justified in denying the claim because, relative to you, it is 
false. There is still disagreement, the relativist says, because you and Sally are evaluating 
the same claim as having different truth values, it just so happens that the claim you are 
evaluating is an evaluation-relative one. As MacFarlane says, "On the relativist's account, 
epistemic modal claims aren't equivalent to any claims about what people know. The former 
are assessment-sensitive, and the latter are not. The relativist can say that every group 
that is debating whether it is possible that infected birds have entered Alameda county (by 
such and such a date) is debating the truth of the same proposition. It's just that the truth 
of this proposition is perspectival." (2011, 23) 
There have been a number of criticisms of the relativist account. The most complete 
is (von Fintel and Gillies, 2008b), a few others can be found in (Hawthorne, 2007). The 
relativist position is so prominent that most articles in the literature not supporting it 
devote a few lines to criticism. I will only discuss here what I see as the two most salient 
criticisms, leaving most others aside. The first is discussed below in section 2.2.3. The 
simple relativist proposal is something like, if Q(B)(cp) is a Moorean indicative mood modal 
uttered in some context, then the modal base B is the set of worlds compatible with what 
is known by the person evaluating the utterance. The problem is that people don't always 
evaluate utterances of Moorean indicative mood modals based on what they know. Not 
every utterance is open to appropriate, problematic evaluations. So the relativist has to 
complicate their story and say that sometimes, in fact, "epistemic modal" claims aren't 
relative after all. 
27 Of course, the full semantics will be a bit more complicated since obviously the context of utterance will 
still be relevant when there are other contextual dependencies. For example, it seems that the world w will 
be determined by the context of utterance. MacFarlane in (2011), section 6.3, gives a definition for "An 
occurrence of a sentence <I> at a context Cu is true as assessed from a context CA iff ... " 
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A bigger problem though is the relativist story about disagreement. There is disagree-
ment between George's evaluation and the kibitzer's evaluation in the Boston Case B. 
George is denying Sally's claim in The Boston Case B. The disagreement comes in, accord-
ing to the relativist, because although the proposition put forward by Sally is one that is 
true or false relative to a context of evaluation, it still is the same proposition which George 
accepts and the kibitzer denies. MacFarlane, in (2007), lays out in detail just how this 
sort of disagreement is supposed to work. MacFarlane's approach, essentially, is to take 
disagreement as something which happens over propositions, i.e. when two people disagree 
they disagree over a proposition. Naively we could say that two people disagree over a 
proposition just in case one accepts it and the other rejects it. (MacFarlane, 2007, 22) 
Following Kaplan, MacFarlane sees propositions as potentially having contextual depen-
dencies and these dependencies cause problems for the naive account. For example, I may 
now accept the proposition that I'm sitting down but in five minutes reject that I'm sitting 
down. Nevertheless in five minutes I wouldn't be disagreeing with my past self. MacFar-
lane's project in (2007) is to sketch out a path towards a general theory of propositional 
disagreement which lets in disagreement over evaluation-relative propositions of the sort he 
thinks is expressed when Sally says, "Joe may be in Boston." 
My complaint is that this is not, intuitively, what disagreement is. Disagreement, if it is 
genuine disagreement, is disagreement over the assignment of truth values at fully specified 
points of evaluation.28 The truth value of a sentence c.p, [c.p], depends on some parameters 
PI, ... ,Pn' For example, assuming c.p itself has no additional dependencies, the contextualist 
says that the truth of Q(8)(c.p) depends on PI = w a world of evaluation and P2 = Cu a 
context of utterance. What can be disagreed over, on this view, is the value [Q(8) (c.p)]W,Cu . 
If you say [Q(8)(c.p)]W,cu = true and I say [Q(8)(c.p)]W,cu = false we disagree. What there 
is to disagree over then, it seems, is the truth value of sentences at fully specified points of 
evaluation. 
This is just what the relativist does not have. On the simple picture, the relativist says 
that the truth of Q(8)(c.p) is relative to a point of evaluation (w, CE). What it would take 
280f course, if one thinks, unlike Kaplan or MacFarlane, that propositions are things that have determinate 
truth values then a story about propositional disagreement will line up with what I say here. 
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for disagreement, then, is for one person to say [Q(8)(tp)]W,CE = true and another to say 
[Q(8)(tp)]W,CE = false for the same point of evaluation (w, CE). What the relativist has in-
stead in The Boston Case B, for example, is that George says [3(8)(Joe is in Boston)]W,Cg = 
true and the kibitzer says [3(8)(Joe is in Boston)]W,Ck = false. That George and the kib-
itzer are evaluating 3(8)(Joe is in Boston) against different points of evaluation "shields" 
them from genuine disagreement. So it seems then that the relativist hasn't saved the 
disagreement.29 
A second response to the examples, what MacFarlane calls cloudy contextualism, is 
offered by von Fintel and Gillies in (2011). Their proposal is to focus on the indeterminacy 
of the context of utterance. They point out that in The Boston Case A there are a number of 
ways to resolve the modal base, i.e. with 8 s , 8 9 or 8 9+S • Their proposal is that the apparent 
ambiguity described above is there "by design." Sally'S utterance (34) in the indeterminate 
context actually is ambiguous in some sense. The seeming inability to resolve the ambiguity 
is because it cannot be resolved: Sally's utterance is genuinely ambiguous. Von Fintel and 
Gillies talk about Sally "putting a proposition into play." Sally utters "Joe may be in 
Boston" in some context Cu which fails to determine an epistemic modal base B. The facts 
up until the time of utterance allow for the context Cu to be resolved in multiple ways, each 
way determining some group G which fixes an epistemic modal base B. Then we say that 
the utterance "puts into play" all of the modal propositions 3(8i)(Joe is in Boston) where 
8 i is a modal base associated with some group Gi picked out by one of the resolutions of 
cu, i.e. 8 s , 8 9 and 8 9+S • (von Fintel and Gillies, 2011, 17) 
Von Fintel and Gillies then develop the pragmatics of such ambiguous utterances in 
a way which accounts for the data. They define when a speaker is justified in making an 
utterance so that if the utterance puts into play the propositions Q(8i )( tp) for i = 1,2, ... ,n, 
then a speaker is justified in making the utterance just in case they are justified in asserting 
at least one of the propositions put into play. (2011, 18) This explains in The Boston 
290ne way to respond to this objection is that I've only described one sort of disagreement---disagreement 
over the assignment of truth values at fully specified points of evaluation-but that there can be other sorts 
of disagreement, for example the sort of propositional disagreement sketched by MacFarlane. Even granting 
that it's hasty to privilege one sort of disagreement as "genuine," I suggest that admitting other sorts of 
disagreement is no help to the relativist. It seems that the appropriate sense of disagreement in these cases 
is disagreement over the assignment of truth values at fully specified points of evaluation. 
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Case A why Sally is justified in uttering (34), since one of the propositions put into play 
is 3(Bs)(Joe is in Boston) and she is justified in asserting this proposition. To account 
for George's evaluation, they suggest that the hearer can justifiably confirm (deny) the 
utterance just in case the strongest proposition put into play by the utterance which he 
justifiably has an opinion about he thinks is true (false). (2011, 19) The disagreement 
between Sally and George is genuine because there is a proposition put into play by Sally, 
3(Bg)(Joe is in Boston) or 3(Bg+s)(Joe is in Boston), which George is explicitly denying. 
The primary criticism I have of "cloudy contextualism," which is very close to the view 
I put forward in section 3.2.3, is that it has trouble handling evaluations by kibitzers. 
The idea is that in The Boston Case A the context allows for Sally's utterance to be 
resolved with a number of modal bases: Bs, Bg or Bg+s. These modal bases seem like 
reasonable resolutions because they involve the epistemic states of people involved in the 
conversation. The problem is that in order to account for the evaluations of kibitzers like 
in The Boston Case B we have to also suppose that the context leaves open many more 
resolutions, resolutions which include the epistemic states of potential eavesdroppers. They 
justify this claim by suggesting that the context actually leaves open all those resolutions 
involving the epistemic states of people involved in the same investigation. They say, "So, 
how can Alex's BEM [bare epistemic modal] have a reading where its claim hinges (partly) 
on what Chuck [the kibitzer] knows? Simple: imagine that what makes someone part of a 
relevant group for a BEM is that they are engaged (in some sense) in the same investigation 
as the overt partners in the conversation." (von Fintel and Gillies, 2011, 27) The charge 
here is simply that this is asking us to imagine too much. It seems reasonable to imagine 
that the context of utterance in The Boston Case B can be resolved with a modal base 
including what's known to a person in the conversation. It's more difficult to imagine that 
a salient resolution of the context is a modal base which includes the epistemic state of 
arbitrary eavesdroppers.3o 
30 Another criticism of cloudy contextualism is its account of the felt disagreement. While the cloudy con-
textualist can say that the third-party is directly evaluating as false a proposition "put into play" by the 
speaker, it's unclear whether merely putting into play, as opposed to explicitly evaluating as true, is enough 
to generate genuine disagreement. Of course, the cloudy contextualist could pull back and suggest that 
there isn't really genuine disagreement and simply offer their story as an explanation for the appearance of 
disagreement. 
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A third response to the examples, standard in descriptive and typological linguistics, is 
expressivism. This proposal treats the modal term in indicative mood modal utterances 
which express the reading of interest as "an expression of the speaker's attitude towards the 
prejacent proposition, rather than giving rise to a complex proposition with its own distinct 
content." (von Fintel and Gillies, 2008a, 41) Some contemporary philosophers who support 
it include Hare (1967), Price (1983) and Swanson (2006). On this proposal the exchanges are 
easy to understand. In uttering (34) Sally says something about her attitude towards 'Joe is 
in Boston,' perhaps noting that she is unwilling to say that Joe isn't in Boston or signaling 
that George shouldn't overlook the possibility.31 If she is putting forward a proposition at 
all it is that Joe is in Boston. George, knowing that this is false, denies it. The well-known 
objection to this position is that it has difficulty describing what happens when Moorean 
indicative mood modals are embedded under other modals.32 Perhaps the primary concern 
with expressivism though, related to issues of embeddings, is that it trivializes the modality. 
Intuitively it seems like Sally can truly say "Joe may be in Boston" in some cases where he 
is not in Boston. But on the expressivist story she cannot. Sally's utterance will be true 
just in case Joe actually is in Boston. 
A last response needing comment is John Hawthorne's. His view, developed in (2007), 
is much like the one I will advocate for below. His essential idea is that there is a distinct, 
non-epistemic reading of the problematic utterances, a "danger" reading. To say "Joe may 
be in Boston" on this reading is to express that there is a danger of Joe being in Boston. 
There being of a danger of something, for Hawthorne, is an objective matter. Hawthorne 
cashes the notion out in terms of close possible worlds: "Let a case be a centred world (in 
Lewis' sense). Let us suppose some cases are close to a given case. X is at t1 in danger of 
F-ing at t2 iff some centred worlds that are close to the actual case centred on X at t1 are 
worlds where X Fs at t2." (2007, 97) Hawthorne explains his position as follows. 
I propose that 'might' claims sometimes have a purely epistemic use--ones that 
are merely tied to the knowledge set of the agent (or perhaps agent plus in-
terlocutors), and a more objective--'danger'-use, that has no straightforward 
31MacFarlane, in (2011, 16), notes that Hare, in (1967, 321), suggests the former, while Fintel and Gillies, in 
(2008a, 42), note that Swanson, in (2006), suggests the latter. 
32See (MacFarlane, 2011) and (von Fintel and Gillies, 2008a, 42) for an overview of the problem. 
analysis in terms of bodies of knowledge. It may be that no individual at a world 
knows that a certain chair is in fact a long way from the edge of the cliff and 
hence the sum total of what everyone in the world knows leaves it open that the 
chair will fall off the cliff. But still, the claim 'There is no danger of the chair 
falling over' is true in the mouth of individuals at that world .... 
Back to the eavesdropping data. Someone says one Sunday morning 'Susan 
might be in the local grocery store'. The account predicts that if the purely 
epistemic use is at work we won't react with a 'False!' verdict. Suppose the 
speech was continued in a way that made it look purely epistemic. Suppose the 
person continued 'Granted, she may have moved out of town. But she may still 
be around here. Really I have no idea. So she may be in the grocery store' I 
think the eavesdropper would not be inclined to contest of the elements of this 
speech. But the account I have proposed also predicts a use which is more or 
less tantamount to 'There is a danger that Susan is in the grocery store'. Here 
the truth conditions are not given by what the speaker knows, nor even by what 
some larger community knows. It turns on whether there is a relevantly similar 
situation to the actual world where Susan is in the grocery store. (Hawthorne, 
2007, 98-99) 
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Several features of Hawthorne's account are nice. Like von Fintel and Gillies, Hawthorne 
suggests that there is some sort of ambiguity at play in the problematic cases. Or at least, 
he suggests that there are alternative readings of the utterances: one epistemic, one the 
danger reading. Hawthorne also suggests, as I do below in section 3.2.2, that when the 
context of utterance makes clear that it is the epistemic reading in play eavesdroppers are 
not prone to making problematic evaluations. 
Given the similarities between Hawthorne's account and the one I develop below, one 
might ask what the differences are. The difference is that while it seems that the danger use 
of modals is one sort of circumstantial reading, i.e. given the circumstances such-and-such 
unwanted consequence may happen, not every circumstantial modal is a danger use. First, 
danger uses seem to be future directed. Second, danger uses seem to focus on unwanted 
consequences. Many of the problematic examples don't seem to involve either of these 
elements. When Sally utters "Joe may be in Boston" in The Boston Case A she is not 
making a future directed claim, nor does there seem to be an element of danger. 33 
33In the end it might be that Hawthorne's danger theoretic sense is not just one type of circumstantial 
modality, as I've laid out the notion. Hawthorne's danger theoretic sense plays on David Lewis's notion of 
chance and there might not be a way to translate there being a chance of something (in Lewis's sense) in 
terms of the circumstances allowing for it (in my sense). Another way in which my account differs from 
Hawthorne's is the way in which it's motivated. I take it that the arguments of section 3 are substantially 
different from Hawthorne's motivation. 
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2.2.3 Comments on the Examples Of course if the examples are not taken at face 
value there are ways to save the basic contextualist scheme. One way for the contextualist 
to respond is simply to reject the data. One could object that The Boston Cases (2.2.1.1 
and 2.2.1.2) and the Bond in Zurich example (2.2.1.3) do not represent how people use 
indicative mood modal constructions. Perhaps in The Boston Case A it would not be 
natural, appropriate or correct for George, knowing that Joe is not in Boston, to reply with 
(35) to Sally's utterance (34), or perhaps in the The Boston Case B you, the kibitzer, would 
not react in the way described, or at least would be misunderstanding what was said if 
you did so. (If this were the case, then there simply would be no evaluations which caused 
an problems and there would be some epistemic state which resolved the ambiguity.) But 
even if one grants that the data is correct, the contextualist could say that the problematic 
utterances-George's utterance (35) and the kibitzers's responses-are not denials of the 
modal claims (34), (37) and (38), but rather denials of their prejacents. (Thus there really 
wouldn't be any disagreement, although perhaps the evaluator would be "disagreeing" with 
the speaker in the sense of rejecting the prejacent.) Perhaps, in The Boston Case A, when 
George says "No" he is actually denying the proposition that Joe is in Boston and not the 
modal proposition expressed by Sally's utterance (34). 
The first response does not seem very plausible in The Boston Case A. First it sure 
seems like a natural way for George, knowing what he does, to reply. But is George's denial 
of Sally's claim appropriate or correct? MacFarlane suggests the following argument for 
both in (2011, 5-6). If George in (35) has inappropriately (or incorrectly) evaluated Sally's 
utterance (34) as false, then it seems that Sally should be able to stand by and defend her 
claim. More specifically, a response from Sally to George's correction which defends her 
claim should be appropriate. Although MacFarlane suggests this test, what he actually 
seems to propose is a bit different. He doesn't suggest that Sally's response to correction 
be appropriate, but rather that it be a natural thing to say. This suggestion is suspect. It 
seems that what is natural for Sally to do at this point is just as much driven by pragmatics 
as it is semantics. What we really want to know, for example, isn't whether conversation 
pragmatics allow for Sally to stand by her claim, but rather whether what is said allows 
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Sally to stand by her claim-a matter of appropriateness.34 In any case, consider how it 
sounds for Sally to defend her claim: 
Sally: Joe may be in Boston. 
George: No, he can't be in Boston. I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley. 
Sally: Okay, then, he can't be in Boston. But I still stand by what I said a second ago. 
MacFarlane suggests that this response sounds terrible, and indeed it does. We may say 
that it sounds inappropriate, even.35 To support this, contrast how that response sounds 
compared to how it sounds for Sally to retract her claim: 
Sally: Joe may be in Boston. 
George: No, he can't be in Boston. I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley. 
Sally: Okay, then, scratch that. I was wrong. 
It sounds more appropriate for Sally to retract her claim, which suggests that George 
has correctly evaluated Sally's utterance (34) as false. MacFarlane suggests that this same 
linguistic data would be just as robust in The Boston Case B, where this time the correction 
comes not from a conversation partner but from you, the kibitzer. Imagine if you jumped 
into the conversation with "No, he can't be in Boston. I just saw him an hour ago here in 
Berkeley." It still sounds bad for Sally to reply, "Okay, then, he can't be in Boston. But I 
still stand by what I said a second ago" and more appropriate for her to retract. 
The second response faces at least three problems. The first is suggested by von Fintel 
and Gillies in (2011). Consider The Boston Case A. If (35) is only denying the prejacent of 
(34) and not the modal claim itself, then plausibly the case where George does not know 
that Joe cannot be in Boston and replies to (34) with "Yeah, that's right" is similarly a 
case where George is affirming the prejacent and not the modal claim itself. But this is 
impossible, since by assumption in this case George does not know whether Joe is in Boston, 
34It should be kept in mind that defending the original assertion is different from reasserting it. Perhaps, 
whatever Sally said when she uttered "He may be in Boston" was true when she said it, but would be false if 
she tried to assert it again after George has informed the group that Joe isn't in Boston. Also, as MacFarlane 
points out, defending her original claim as assertable is different from defending it as true. What we are 
interested in is whether Sally can defend her original assertion as true (without necessarily reasserting it.) 
35 Admittedly differentiating between whether Sally's response is inappropriate or just unnatural is difficult, 
but I believe that the distinction must be made if the argument is to say anything about the semantics as 
opposed to the pragmatics. 
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so he can't appropriately affirm the prejacent. It just seems that if a response of "No" to 
(34) is a denial of the prejacent, then the corresponding response of "Yes" should be an 
affirmation of the prejacent-but it's not. 
The second problem is suggested by MacFarlane and comes from a contrast case. (Mac-
Farlane, 2011, 4-5) Consider another modal claim where the denial really is aimed at just 
the prejacent. 
Sally: It's rumored that you are leaving California. 
George: That's completely false! 
It seems clear that in this case George is not denying that such-and-such was rumored, 
but instead denying that he's leaving California. Imagine if Sally asked, "You mean that 
it's rumored, or that you're leaving?" Unusual circumstances aside, George would naturally 
reply, "That I'm leaving, of course." But contrast this to The Boston Case A. In contrast to 
the example just given, it sounds like George is denying Sally's whole claim in The Boston 
Case A, and if asked just what he was denying he would probably say he's denying that it's 
possible Joe is in Boston. Again the same two considerations are supposed to show that it 
is also the whole modal claim that is being denied in the kibitzer cases. 
The third problem is most salient in inconsistent evaluation cases where there is a strong 
feeling of disagreement. In the Bond example it feels like Leiter and Blofeld are disagreeing 
when Leiter says "That's false" and Blofeld says "That's true." If Leiter really just meant 
that the prejacent of Number 2's utterance (38)-'Bond is in Zurich'-is false, then he isn't 
disagreeing with Blofeld who is affirming the modal claim asserted by (38). While a story 
saving the feeling of disagreement could be told, this second response will only be successful 
if the feeling of disagreement can be saved. 
So much for rejecting the examples at face value, at least in the case when (i) the 
"problematic" evaluations are appropriate and (ii) there is a feeling of disagreement between 
what is asserted by the speaker and what is asserted by the "problematic" evaluation. It 
is important to note though, as von Fintel and Gillies do, that intuitions vary on whether 
or not George can appropriately respond the way he does to Sally in The Boston Case 
A. It is MacFarlane's argument from retraction which presents persuasive evidence for the 
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appropriateness of George's reply. If Sally can appropriately defend her original claim then 
it seems as if something has gone wrong with George's evaluation-he did not understand 
Sally's claim. This is important because I take the ability to force retractions---or at least 
prevent the speaker from standing by their original claim-as the best evidence for the 
appropriateness of the "problematic" evaluations. 
It should be noted that those like MacFarlane and Egan who advance the above examples 
against contextualism do not see these as isolated cases. MacFarlane goes so far as to suggest 
at some places that people always evaluate the truth of a Moorean utterance of an indicative 
mood modal against their own knowledge. (2011, 8-10) (At other places he backs off from 
this claim.36) Certainly the simplest forms of relativism and expressivism about "epistemic 
modals" suggest as much. But it seems clear that such a radical claim is false, as there are 
a number of counterexamples. Consider Hacking's lottery cases (2.1.3.4). Someone looking 
back at the friend's utterance (19) who knows that Fred did not win the lottery does not 
evaluate (19) as false. In hindsight (19) still seems true; Fred may have won the lottery. 
Another example is John Hawthorne's Suzy-on-the-bus example. 
Example 2.2.3.1. Suzy-on-the-Bus. (Hawthorne, 2007) Suzy, who hates John, gets on 
a bus and hides. John isn't on the bus, but his friend is. Perplexed at Suzy's hiding, John's 
friend calls John. (40) John's friend: Why is Suzy hiding on the bus? 
(41) John: Suzy is hiding because I may be on the bus. 
(42) John's friend: Oh, something happen between you two? 
(43) John: No, she still owes me 100 bucks. 
Both John and his friend, of course, know that John isn't on the bus. Nevertheless both 
John and his friend take (41) to be true. John can appropriately offer that he may be on 
the bus as an explanation of Suzy's hiding. o 
Further, von Fintel and Gillies point out that the argument from retraction used to show 
that George did evaluate appropriately (and correctly) Sally's utterance in The Boston Case 
36See his unpublished article "Epistemic Modals: Relativism vs. Cloudy Contextualism" presented at the 
Chambers Philosophy Conference on Epistemic Modals, University of Nebraska April 16th, 2010. 
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A does not always work. Consider the following example given by them. (von Fintel and 
Gillies, 2008b, 81) 
Example 2.2.3.2. The Missing Car Keys. Billy has lost his keys. He walks into the 
kitchen and sees Alex. 
(44) Alex: The keys may be in the drawer. 
(45) Billy: (Looks in the drawer, agitated.) They're not. Why did you say that? 
(46) Alex: Look, I didn't say they were in the drawer. I said they may be there--and they 
might have been. Sheesh. 0 
The point of the example, as von Fintel and Gillies describe, is that speakers can often 
resist the push for a retraction and can even standby what they say. Von Fintel and Gillies 
describe a number of other examples where speakers can resist the push for retraction, but 
one sort of example not given by them is of a particularly important kind. Consider The 
Cancer Test A example. Imagine if the doctor overheard Jane say (27)-that it's possible 
John as cancer. In the example the doctor knows that John does not have cancer. Imagine 
him jumping into the conversation: 
Jane: It's possible that John has cancer. He has some of the symptoms. But it's by 
no means certain that he's got it. They've run a test on him which may rule cancer 
out, but they won't tell us the results of the test until tomorrow. 
The doctor: It's impossible that John has cancer, I have the test results right in front 
of me! 
Jane: Excuse me, but I was obviously referring to what was known before the test. 
In this case Jane resists the push for a retraction, but she resists it by referring back to 
the bit of context which seemed to fix the group of people relevant to the modal claim. 
Of course, it may be objected that Jane's reply "Excuse me, but ... " is an awkward or 
unnatural thing to say. (After all, given the topic of discussion we expect Jane to jump 
up and express relief at the fact that her husband does not have cancer!) But recall that 
the question is not whether it is natural for Jane to stand by her assertion, but whether it 
is appropriate in the sense that it is something within the bounds of semantic meaning to 
say. Here I suggest that, in contrast to Sally's response "Okay, then, he can't be in Boston. 
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But I still stand by what I said a second ago" to correction in The Boston Case A, this 
response by Jane is appropriate. The difference is the reference to tests provided by the 
context-Jane's original utterance sets up a context which picks out a certain epistemic 
state as the modal base and her reply to the doctor is within the bounds of this meaning. 
As I argue later in section 3.2.2, these cases where the speaker resists retracting by referring 
back to the context are important in understanding Moorean indicative mood modals. 
With that said, even if there are examples of Moorean indicative mood modals that are 
not open to problematic evaluations there does seem to be examples of ones that are. I take 
The Boston Cases (2.2.1.1 and 2.2.1.2) and The Bond in Zurich example (2.2.1.3) to be as 
good of cases of problematic evaluations as any. Most who disagree can probably construct 
their own examples. This point is important, for even if examples like the lottery, bus and 
cancer cases are problematic for simple versions of relativism, cases like the Boston ones 
are problematic for contextualism.37 
Just above I referred to examples like The Boston Cases and Bond in Zurich as cases 
where the indicative mood modal is open to "problematic evaluations." The following 
definition attempts to make this idea a bit more precise. 
Definition 2.2.3.3. An evaluation of (or reply to) a Moorean utterance of an indicative 
mood modal is problematic if and only if there is no modal base B such that if the original 
M oorean utterance expressed Q (B) ( cp) both it and the evaluation would be appropriate. 
Thus we can say that an indeterminacy in the context of utterance of a Moorean indicative 
mood modal is unresolvable if that utterance is open to problematic evaluations. (Con-
jecture: an utterance whose context is not indeterminate with respect to a modal base is 
not open to appropriate problematic evaluations.) The standard way to avoid a problem-
atic evaluation in any given case is to argue that the evaluation isn't appropriate in the 
first place-and thus that there shouldn't be a modal base which makes sense of both the 
original utterance and evaluation. The standard objection to this move is to argue that it 
is inappropriate for the speaker to stand by their claim. The second approach to avoiding 
37There are a number of other issues related to the data on these sorts of problematic cases which will not 
be discussed here. Some of these are raised in (von Fintel and Gillies, 2011) and (von Fintel and Gillies, 
2008b). 
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a problematic evaluation is to claim that what is being expressed by the utterance isn't in 
fact an evaluation, e.g. George is commenting on the modal claim associated with what he 
knows, or simply targeting the prejacent of Sally's utterance. This move is blocked when 
we have a case of disagreement. 
Definition 2.2.3.4. An example involving an utterance of a Moorean indicative mood modal 
is a problematic example if and only if the utterance is open to a problematic evaluation 
which would be appropriate. 
Thus all problematic examples involve Moorean utterances which are open to problem-
atic evaluations, but not all examples involving Moorean utterances and problematic eval-
uations are themselves problematic since the problematic evaluation in the example may 
itself not be appropriate. But, all examples involving Moorean utterances and problematic 
evaluations where a retraction is forced are problematic by the argument above. (Conjec-
ture: every example which is problematic is a case where a retraction can be forced.) Of 
course, not all problematic examples are really "problematic," since presumably there are 
problematic examples where the problematic evaluation really isn't an evaluation of the 
original utterance but instead targets the prejacent. Thus the topic for discussion is prob-
lematic examples where there is felt disagreement between the original utterance and the 
problematic evaluation. Hereafter I shall only talk of problematic examples where there is 
felt disagreement, since the other sorts aren't really problematic for anyone. 
It is not unreasonable to say that problematic examples in the sense of definition 2.2.3.4, 
in one guise or another, have been the problem in the contemporary literature on "epistemic 
modals." The reason problematic evaluations (in genuine problematic examples, i.e. those 
where a retraction can be forced) of Moorean indicative mood modals are problematic is 
that, assuming they do express epistemic modal propositions, there does not seem to be 
an epistemic modal base over which the modal could quantify. A simple suggestion is that 
Moorean utterances of indicative mood modals which are open to problematic evaluations, 
contra the canon and contemporary discussions, do not express epistemic modal proposi-
tions. That is, anyway, the most straightforward conclusion to draw. In the next section 
(3) I develop this idea further, first showing that there is little by way of argument for 
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the claim that Moorean utterances of indicative mood modals in problematic examples ex-
press epistemic modality, and then showing (i) that the problematic cases can be explained 
on a non-epistemic reading of the Moorean utterance and (ii) that cases where the utter-
ance is epistemic and where a retraction can be forced are cases where the context is not 
indeterminate with respect to a modal base, and hence are not problematic. 
3 Problematic Evaluations and Epistemic Modality 
John Hawthorne's article (2007) is the only article in the contemporary literature to suggest 
that problematic cases of Moorean indicative mood modals are cases where the utterance 
does not express epistemic modality. The way in which most of the contemporary literature 
on "epistemic modals" approaches the topic seems to exclude non-epistemic readings. In 
the classical literature by Hacking et al. 'epistemic modal' is a grammatical sortal; the 
object of study is something like Moorean indicative mood modals, and arguments are re-
quired to show that utterances of such sentences express epistemic modality (in the sense 
of definition 2.1.5.1.) But in much of the contemporary literature 'epistemic modal' is a 
semantic sortal; the object of study is something like the type of possibility expressed by 
utterances of Moorean indicative mood modals on their epistemic reading.1 After introduc-
ing the notion of an "epistemic modal" in this sense problematic cases of indicative mood 
modals are presented with the tacit assumption that in the case at hand the utterance ex-
presses the epistemic reading introduced previously---or at least the tacit assumption that 
the problematic evaluation really is appropriate when the original utterance takes on the 
epistemic reading. 2 
Although Hacking et al. took a grammatical approach to "epistemic modals," they 
seemed to have held with minimal caveats the following two claims. 
(C1) All Moorean utterances of indicative mood modal constructions express the same 
flavor of possibility. 
(C2) That flavor is epistemic, in the sense that the truth conditions of the clause depend 
somehow on some epistemic state. 
For example, Moore affirms (C1) and (C2) in (Moore, 1959, 234). Hacking affirms them 
IBy the contemporary literature I mean roughly (Barnett, 2009; Egan, 2007; Egan et al., 2005; von Fintel 
and Gillies, 2011; 2008b; Hawthorne, 2007; Huemer, 2007; MacFarlane, 2011; Stephenson, 2007; Yalcin, 
2007). Not all of these authors though take this "semantic" approach. 
2There is a good bit of effort in the literature to motivate the intuition that problematic responses like (35) 
are appropriate and correct as responses to the indicative mood modal in the example, but a subtle point 
is that this is not to argue that the problematic responses are appropriate and correct on every available 
reading of the indicative mood modal. 
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in (1967, 149-150) and (1975, 325).3 While DeRose explicitly argues for (C2), he seems to 
take (C1) for granted. (DeRose, 1991, 582-583) 
These points have been questioned in the philosophical literature, although usually not 
in direct connection with problematic cases. For example, although he is not concerned 
with problematic evaluations, Alan White while affirming (C1) argues that (C2) is false. 
(White, 1975, 52) In an attempt to defuse problems for contextualism, John Hawthorne 
argues against (C1) in (2007; 97). Kai von Fintel and Anthony Gillies have contradicted 
the broader claim that all indicative mood modals express the same flavor of possibility 
in their expository writing on modals, but unlike Hawthorne have not tried to address the 
problematic examples in this way.4 (von Fintel and Gillies, 2008a; von Fintel, 2006) 
My aim in the first part of this section (3.1) is to discuss the arguments for the epistemic 
reading of utterances in problematic examples and to discuss the problems which arise from 
the "semantic" approach of the contemporary literature. The conclusion on the former point 
is that none of the traditional arguments used to show that some utterances of Moorean 
indicative mood modals are epistemic run in cases when the utterance is open to problematic 
evaluations. The major problem with the current approach to epistemic modals is that it 
begs the question of whether acceptable, problematic evaluations really are possible for 
epistemic modals. A more general but related topic addressed is whether or not every 
Moorean utterance of an indicative mood modal expresses the epistemic reading. I show 
that this is false. 
The aim of the second part of this section (3.2) is to give a positive argument for the 
claim that no problematic examples involve utterances which express epistemic modality 
(sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2) and then to give a positive account of what sort of modality is 
being expressed by utterances in problematic examples (section 3.2.3). (Alternatively, one 
could also put the claim as follows. There is a reading of Moorean indicative mood modals, 
e.g. 'It's possible that <p,' on which they express some sort of epistemic modality, but no 
3Hacking doesn't quite agree with with (C1) and (C2); Hacking defines a grammatical class of modal 
sentences-"L-occurrences"-which is slightly different from indicative mood Modals. But, Hacking would 
affirm (C1) and (C2) if 'Moorean instances of indicative mood modal constructions' was replaced by 'L-
occurrences' . 
4There are probably few working on natural language modals who would hold such a claim, but I suspect 
that the weaker claim (01) is at least tacitly held by some. 
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utterances of Moorean indicative mood modals which are open to appropriate problematic 
evaluations express just this reading.) The positive argument that none of the utterances 
in problematic examples express the epistemic reading turns on an argument about when 
retractions can be forced. I argue, with some necessary refinements, that if an evaluation of 
an utterance of a Moorean indicative mood modal expressing the epistemic reading forces 
a retraction, then the context of utterance picks out a group G which fixes the modal base 
B. In line with Kent Bach and von Fintel and Gillies' proposals, my positive account is 
that the utterances in problematic examples fail to definitely express a single proposition 
but rather are ambiguous between both epistemic and circumstantial readings. It is this 
ambiguity between both epistemic and circumstantial readings which best accounts for all 
the data provided by the kibitzer cases. 
3.1 The Epistemic Reading of Indicative Mood Modals 
3.1.1 Arguments for the Epistemic Reading Section 2 concluded with the sug-
gestion that utterances of Moorean indicative mood modals which are open to appropriate 
problematic evaluations do not express epistemic modality, in the sense of definition 2.1.5.1. 
A variety of arguments that utterances of indicative mood modals express epistemic modal-
ity have appeared in the literature. The goal of this section (3.1.1) is to show that none of 
these arguments establishes that the problematic examples are cases where the utterance 
expresses epistemic modality. 
The first argument is the one which motivated Moore to call indicative mood modals 
'epistemic:' problematic examples involve Moorean utterances of indicative mood modals, 
and, so the argument would go, all Moorean utterances of modal sentences must express 
some sort of epistemic modality. (They are Moorean after all, i.e. false when the prejacent 
is known by someone.) If this line of argument were valid it would imply that all Moorean 
utterances of indicative mood modals express the same flavor of possibility-an epistemic 
flavor. 5 
The crucial premise of the argument-that all Moorean utterances of modal sentences 
5Because of our rather coarse notion of "flavor" it would imply that all Moorean utterances of indicative mood 
modals express the same flavor of possibility, but would leave open the possibility that different Moorean 
utterances of indicative mood modals express different sorts of possibility, all of which taste epistemic. 
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express epistemic modality-is false. It's also not true that all Moorean utterances of 
indicative mood modal sentences express epistemic modality. For a counterexample, assume 
that an utterance expresses a circumstantial modal, i.e. expresses the proposition Q(B)(cp) 
where the modal base B is picked out by the context as the set of all worlds left open by the 
particular circumstances of the context.6 For a specific example, perhaps Joe's mother-
who lives in Boston-is sick and Joe being the considerate son that he is is thinking of 
visiting. Then say B is all the worlds compatible with the mother's current condition and 
Joe's considerate disposition along with any other pertinent facts about the situation. Then 
if cp is the proposition that Joe will drive to Boston tomorrow the original utterance will be 
true just in case there is a world compatible with the mother's condition, Joe's considerate 
disposition and all the other pertinent facts in which Joe does drive to Boston tomorrow. 
But clearly this utterance is Moorean. Say the speaker happened to know that Joe's car was 
broken down and that Joe had no alternative means of transportation. The speaker could 
not truly utter Q(B)(cp). Similarly, if anyone else around knew about Joe's transportation 
woes they would evaluate the speaker's utterance as false. Of course, in these cases what 
would "make" the speaker's utterance false is not that the speaker or some kibitzer knew 
that Joe had no way to get to Boston the next day, but that Joe had no way to get to 
Boston the next day. That is, there is no world compatible with the circumstances-that 
Joe's car is broken down-in which Joe drives to Boston tomorrow. But, as knowledge 
implies truth someone knowing that Joe had no way to get to Boston the next day would 
imply that Joe had no way to get to Boston the next day. Thus this is a clear example of 
a Moorean modal that is not epistemic. 
Example 3.1.1.1. The Boston Case C. George, Sally and Ed are talking in the coffee 
line. Joe is absent today. It's common knowledge among the group that Joe's mother lives 
in Boston. 
(47) Ed: I heard Joe's mother is really sick; she's got the fiu. 
(48) Sally: That's terrible. He may be heading up to Boston for the weekend then. 
(49) George: No, he can't. His car is in the shop right now. o 
6Here I'm not using 'circumstance' in any technical sense. One could replace it with something like "relevant 
facts that obtain." 
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Since the context of an utterance often determines the flavor of a modal,7 a second 
way to argue that a given problematic case is epistemic is to argue that the context of 
the utterance picks out the flavor as being epistemic. The strategy would be to argue, 
for example, that utterances (34) and (37) in The Boston Cases A and B (2.2.1.1 and 
2.2.1.2) and (38) in the Bond in Zurich example (2.2.1.3) are uttered in a context which 
fixes them as epistemic. The problem though is that the context of these examples cannot 
fix the utterances as epistemic via fixing some epistemic state as the modal base, since 
as mentioned in section 2.2.1 the contexts of utterance do not pick out determinately a 
modal base. Indeed, as conjectured at the end of section 2.2.3 no problematic utterance 
has a context which determinately picks out a modal base, so in general the contexts of 
problematic utterances will not pick out the flavor as epistemic via picking out an epistemic 
state as a modal base. It is worth fleshing out this conjecture a bit more. Consider the 
following modification of The Boston Case where the context does determinately pick out 
an epistemic state as the modal base. 
Example 3.1.1.2. The Boston Case D. George, Sally and Ed are talking in the coffee 
line. Joe is absent today. 
(50) Ed: Sally, do you know where Joe is today? 
(51) Sally: He may be in Boston. o 
Here I suggest that Ed's question (50) picks out the worlds compatible with what Sally 
knows as the modal base B for the modal claim expressed by Sally's utterance (51). But as 
in that case, as soon as the context does enough work to pick determinately some epistemic 
state as the modal base, problematic evaluations become inappropriate. If George corrected 
Sally, she could avoid retracting her claim by pointing back to the salient bit of context 
that fixed what she knew as the relevant epistemic state. 
Example 3.1.1.3. The Boston Case E. George, Sally and Ed are talking in the coffee 
line. Joe is absent today. 
(52) Ed: Sally, do you know where Joe is today? 
7See (von Fintel and Gillies, 2008aj von Fintel, 2006) for a discussion. 
(53) Sally: He may be in Boston. 
(54) George: No, he can't be in Boston; I just saw him in his office a little bit ago. 
(55) Sally: Well he may not be, but given what I knew he could have been. 
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D 
I suggest that although Sally's reply (55) may not be the most natural thing to say-
certainly it is rather quirky and does not move the conversation forward-it is an appropriate 
thing to say given Ed's question (52), in the sense that it fits within the bounds of intuitive 
linguistic meaning. That is, one could not fault Sally as lacking linguistic competence, given 
the response. 
But the context of a problematic utterance perhaps picks the flavor as epistemic without 
determinately picking an epistemic state as the modal base.8 Perhaps it could be argued 
for a given case such as Number 2's utterance (38) in the Bond example that the context 
did enough work to fix the flavor as epistemic but not enough work to fix a particular 
epistemic state. Although one could try to argue in this way, I don't think this approach 
can be successful. The argument will be fully given in section 3.2.2, after some more needed 
development is given. 
A third way to argue that a problematic case is epistemic is to argue that no other flavor 
of modality makes sense of the utterance. This is DeRose's method in (1991) for arguing that 
the utterances in the Cancer Tests Cases 2.1.3.9 and 2.1.3.10 express epistemic modality. 
Perhaps the same argument could be applied to problematic cases like The Boston Cases. 
The key feature in the Cancer Test Cases for DeRose's argument is that Jane and the doctor 
seem to disagree--one says it's possible that John has cancer while the other says not-
and, assuming they both speak truly, the disagreement can only be avoided if the respective 
utterances (27) and (28) are read as epistemic modals with different modal bases. If they 
are read in a non-epistemic way then presumably there is some non-epistemic modal base 
8 such that (27) is affirming, and (28) is denying, the proposition 3(8)(John has cancer.).9 
Ignoring the possibility of relativistic semantics for modals, it is clear that this specific 
argument will not work for problematic utterances like those in The Boston Cases. In 
8The context would do this when it did the same semantic work as a non-specific restricting clause, e.g. 'In 
view of what is known ... ' 
9This seems to be the argument DeRose has in mind, anyway. I'm not convinced that (27) and (28) cannot 
be read in a non-epistemic way without (27) affirming, and (28) denying, the same proposition. 
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problematic cases there is genuine disagreement, not just apparent disagreement. Sally 
says "He may be in Boston" and George says "No, he can't be." While both utterances 
seem to be appropriate, if the disagreement is genuine then one of them must be speaking 
falsely. The move to the epistemic reading in the Cancer Test Cases was to save both 
utterances as true, but here if indeed there is disagreement either Sally or George have 
spoken falsely. And, if we lose the disagreement the example is no longer problematic: the 
motivation for saying that George's reply "No" was a direct denial of Sally's assertion was 
that the reply expressed disagreement. Of course, if we entertain a relativistic semantics one 
could try to save the disagreement while admitting both utterances as true (with respect to 
their respective, relativistically determined, modal bases.) In addition there are surely other 
strategies for arguing that only an epistemic reading makes sense of a given problematic 
case. (It would not be feasible to try to respond to all potential arguments here.) 
But in general this strategy seems misplaced in the case of problematic evaluations. 
Problematic examples, on the face of it, are cases where the epistemic reading does not fit. 
They are cases where no single modal base associated with an epistemic state makes sense 
of the utterances. If one successfully argued that a given problematic case could not be 
interpreted as a non-epistemic modal this would still not answer the problem of there being 
no epistemic modal base that fit the example. 
Although using this strategy on examples like The Boston Case may not work well, 
the force of the argument is felt most for indicative mood modals such as 'Goldbach's 
conjecture may be true, and it may be false' whose prejacents are alethically necessary.lO 
These indicative mood modals, the usual line goes, must be epistemic since it seems as 
if someone would speak truly if they both said that Goldbach's conjecture may be true 
and that it may be false. If Goldbach's conjecture is true, then it's a logical necessity 
and is true in all possible worlds. But, suppose it's true. It seems that someone would 
speak truly if they said that it might be false, at least on the sense of this assertion which 
expresses something associated with the fact that the conjecture has not been proven.ll (At 
the time of writing Goldbach's conjecture has neither been proven nor disproved.) Since 
lOThe example is from MacFarlane, (2011). 
llContra Seth Yalcin's paper (2007), I don't see anything wrong with the last two sentences. 
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either Goldbach's conjecture is true in all logically possible worlds or false in all logically 
possible worlds and both 'Goldbach's conjecture may be true' and 'Goldbach's conjecture 
may be false' can be truly said at least on one reading, this reading cannot express logical 
possibility. So the reading expresses some sort of epistemic possibility.12 But if this is to 
be turned into an argument that there are some problematic cases which express epistemic 
modality one has to also argue that examples involving utterances of these sentences can be 
problematic. As I shall argue in section 3.2.2 cases involving these examples are not cases 
where retractions can be forced, and hence not problematic. 
A fourth argument is suggested by Hacking in (1975).13 Epistemic contexts are generally 
referentially opaque. For example, Q(B)(Pa) would be referentially opaque just in case a = b 
and Q(B)(Pa) could be true while Q(B)(Pb) is false. Consider the following example. 
(56) Hesperus may be a star. 
(57) Phosphorus may be a star. 
If (56) could be true while (57) is false, then the two modal propositions expressed are 
referentially opaque, which would suggest that they are epistemic. But, contra Hacking, 
it is not clear that there is referential opacity in this case. It's true that someone could 
coherently believe (56) while denying (57), but the question is whether (56) could be true 
while (57) false. As would be expected, when the epistemic reading is forced we get that 
the prejacent is opaque. Consider: 
(58) Given what's known, Hesperus may be a star. 
(59) Given what's known, Phosphorus may be a star. 
(58) can be true while (59) is false, since what's known could rule out Phosphorus being 
a star while it's not known that Hesperus is Phosphorus. So evidently when indicative 
mood modals such as (56) express an epistemic reading the prejacents are opaque. But the 
question is whether or not indicative mood modals uttered in problematic examples, such 
as Sally's utterance (34), express the epistemic reading. 
12It's not clear to me that such sentences cannot express any other sort of modality. The desperate mathe-
matician who needs a certain statement to be true in order for his proof to be valid could truly say something 
like "This conjecture must be true!" where the modal proposition expressed is bouletic. 
13This argument deserves a much more substantial treatment than the one presented here. To be honest it's 
a bit quirky and I'm not sure exactly what to say about it. 
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I have very thin intuitions on whether, e.g., (56) can be true while (57) false when they're 
placed in specific examples (and none when they're context free.) But, one important point 
to note is that in cases where the modal is open to evaluation against what is known by 
third-parties its prejacent shows a sort of referentially inopacity. Consider the following 
exchange: 
Hesperus may be a star. 
It can't be; Hesperus is Phosphorus, and Phosphorus isn't a star! 
Indeed, one of our cases of problematic assessment can easily be put into similar form: 
Example 3.1.1.4. The Boston Case F. George, Sally and Ed are talking in the coffee 
line. Joe is absent today and Sally mistakenly thinks that Providence is Beantown. 
(60) Ed: I wonder where Joe is today. 
(61) Sally: He may be visiting Beantown. 
(62) George: No, he's can't be in Boston; but he did say he might visit Providence. 0 
As before, it doesn't seem that Sally can stand by her statement. Imagine her trying: "Oh, 
well he might have been in Beantown." This just seems false. Even if she tries to work in 
her own epistemic state she does little better: "Oh, well he might have been in Beantown, 
given what I knew." Sally presumably had reason to think Joe was in Providence when 
she uttered (61). We can even imagine that Sally knows Joe isn't in Boston-maybe he 
hates Boston. It seems that in this case, given what she knew Joe couldn't have been in 
Beantown. Her knowledge or lack thereof of the reference of 'Beantown' doesn't seem to 
make (61) true. Given what she knew Joe couldn't have been in Boston, but he might have 
been in Providence. 
The idea is that in problematic cases the prejacent of the modal utterance is not opaque 
insofar as evaluators can appropriately evaluate the utterance by replacing co-referring 
terms. This suggests that the utterances in problematic examples do not have opaque 
prejacents. So it cannot be argued along these lines that the utterances in problematic ex-
amples express the epistemic reading-since their prejacents are not opaque. This inopacity 
also suggests that the utterances express non-epistemic readings. 
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Above I have considered four ways to argue, for given problematic cases, that the utter-
ance expresses epistemic modality--or more precisely to argue that the utterance expresses 
the epistemic use of Moorean indicative mood modals. All of the argument strategies 
discussed though come from the classical literature by Hacking et al. The contemporary 
literature, on the other hand, does not present arguments that utterances which are open 
to problematic evaluations-that is, problematic examples---express the epistemic reading. 
There are, it seems to me, three potential reasons for this. First, contemporary authors 
may tacitly assume that all utterances of Moorean indicative mood modals with the pre-
jacent in the present tense, or perhaps all utterances of modals which are of the form the 
author has in mind, express the epistemic reading. This was, with few reservations, a view 
held by Moore, Hacking and possibly DeRose. Second, contemporary authors may simply 
think it's intuitive or clear that a given problematic example, such as The Boston Case, is 
an instance where the utterance expresses epistemic modality. (This seems to be the tacit 
assumption in MacFarlane (2011), for example.) Third, contemporary authors may think 
that there is a "default" reading to utterances of Moorean indicative mood modals, which is 
the epistemic reading, and hence that problematic examples express the epistemic reading 
by default. (Yalcin, for example, states that the epistemic reading is the default reading. 
(Yalcin, 2007)) 
These three suggestions shall be addressed in detail over the next two sections. The first 
suggestion, that all utterances of Moorean indicative mood modals express the epistemic 
reading, is simply false. An example above, (48) in The Boston Case C, shows that it is false 
when the indicative mood modal has a prejacent in the future tense, since then it's relatively 
easy to get a circumstantial reading. The next section will argue that there are also non-
epistemic examples with the prejacent in the present tense. The second two suggestions are 
more difficult to respond to, but the essential difficulty with them is that even if it's granted 
that an example is epistemic, whether in virtue of linguistic intuition or via acceptance of 
a default reading, it will not be clear, given the fact that not all utterances are epistemic, 
whether that utterance on the epistemic reading is open to problematic evaluations or 
whether the sentence uttered is only open to problematic evaluations when it expresses 
some non-epistemic reading. 
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3.1.2 Flexibility and Non-epistemic Indicative Mood Modals Many modal terms 
can express multiple flavors of modality. The following examples involving the modal 'have 
to' are from (von Fintel, 2006). 
(63) It has to be raining. [after observing people coming inside with wet umbrellas; epis-
temic modality] 
(64) Visitors have to leave by six pm. [hospital regulations; deontic] 
(65) You have to go to bed in ten minutes. [stern father; bouletic] 
(66) I have to sneeze. [given the current state of one's nose; circumstantial] 
(67) To get home in time, you have to take a taxi. [teleological] 
The brackets following each sentence point to their "standard" reading, but of course the 
same sentence can express different flavors of modality, depending on the context of ut-
terance. For example, (65) has a teleological reading (when uttered to one who must rise 
early), while (63) has a bouletic reading (when uttered by the farmer with withering crops.) 
These examples also raise interesting questions on contextualism about flavors of modality 
besides the epistemic sort. For example, (64) seems to be naturally read as deontic and 
the modal base B the set of worlds compatible with what is permissible given some regula-
tions.14 The presupposition then is that the context will fix the set of regulations relevant 
to the utterance. One may wonder then whether there are "problematic cases" for deontic 
modals analogous to problematic cases for epistemic modals. This is a topic I do not pursue 
here. 
At least some indicative mood modal constructions are also semantically flexible, as 
example 3.1.1.1 already showed. As in that example this is seen easily when the prejacent 
is not in the present tense, although it's worth rehashing for the sake of discussing how 
non-epistemic readings of "bare" indicative mood modal constructions relate to those with 
restricting clauses. Consider the following example. 
(68) It may rain tonight. 
14When I say that (64) is "naturally" read as deontic, one thing I have in mind is that 'Visitors have to leave 
by six pm' expresses, more or less, the same thing as 'In view of what's permissible, visitors have to leave 
by six pm.' To get a non-deontic reading, it seems that either the context or an explicit restricting clause 
must be added to cancel the "natural" reading. 
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Someone uttering (68) could equally be expressing something about their knowledge or 
something about the current state of the atmosphere. The utterance seems to be ambiguous 
between the two readings, and without the right context would call for clarification.15 These 
two different readings can be brought out with the use of restricting clauses: 
(69) (a) Given what is known, it may rain tonight. 
(b) As far as is known, it will rain tonight. 16 
(70) (a) Given the current atmospheric conditions, it may rain tonight. 
(b) Current atmospheric conditions allow for rain. 
Each of the first synonymous pair (69 a,b) expresses the epistemic reading of (68), while each 
of the second synonymous pair (70 a, b) expresses the circumstantial reading. (The point in 
giving multiple examples is that various restricting clauses can do the same work, also in 
each case the second example (b) is suppose to be a more colloquial version of the first, (a).) 
If an utterance of (68) expresses the proposition Q(B)(It will rain), then the function of the 
additional restricting clauses is to fix the modal base B. In (69 a,b) the modal base B is fixed 
as the worlds compatible with what is known, while in (70 a,b) the modal base B is fixed as 
the worlds compatible with the current atmospheric conditions. Of course, the restricting 
clauses in (69 a,b) don't quite fix B, since they reference "what is known" without specifying 
which epistemic state. This could be fixed with a more definite restricting clause, say one 
like 'Given what I know' or 'Given what Joe knows.' In the case when the restricting clause 
is 'Given what is known by the National Weather Service,' the modal base B fixed may even 
line up with the the modal base fixed by the non-epistemic restricting clause 'Given the 
current atmospheric conditions,' assuming the National Weather Service has correct data 
on current atmospheric conditions. 
Thus restricting clauses are a device for fixing the modal base B of an expression.17 The 
above examples show that when the prejacent is in the future tense restricting clauses can be 
15 As discussed at the beginning of section 2.2.1, the ambiguity here is the sort introduced by there being a 
number of ways to resolve the modal base. 
16Kent Bach in (2011) notes that unlike the phrases such as 'Given what is known,' those like 'As far as is' 
known' end up expressing some sort of epistemic modality without an explicit modal word. For example, 
(69 b) seems to express the same proposition as 'As far as is known, it may rain tonight.' 
17The content ofthis discussion of restricting clauses is not original to me. Von Fintel and Gillies (von Fintel 
and Gillies, 2008aj 2011) and Bach (2011) both essentially explicate the same material. 
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used to force non-epistemic readings on at least some indicative mood modal constructions. 
(Assuming we expand definition 2.1.2.1 so that if 'P is an indicative mood modal, then 
the addition of a restricting clause to 'P remains an indicative mood modal.) A modal 
utterance with a restricting clause that adequately fixes a modal base B will not be open 
to problematic evaluations. As MacFarlane himself suggests in (2011), if The Boston Case 
A (Example 2.2.1.1) was run so that Sally says something like, "In view of what I know, he 
may be in Boston" instead of just "He may be in Boston" then George's denial would be 
inappropriate. Sally could easily reply then just as she does in The Boston Case E (Example 
3.1.1.3) with something like, "Well he may not be, but given what I knew he could have 
been!" These considerations also suggest that the context of utterance sometimes does the 
same work as a restricting clause. For example, even though Sally's utterance in The Boston 
Case E does not involve a restricting phrase the context-Ed's question-seems to pick out 
the same modal base B-the worlds compatible with what Sally knows-as the clause 'In 
view of what I know' spoken by Sally. 
Von Fintel and Gillies (2008a) and (2011) as well as Kent Bach (2011) refer to those 
modal sentences without restricting clauses as bare modals. Thus bare indicative mood 
modals are those indicative mood modals lacking restricting clauses. All the problematic 
examples are those involving utterances of bare indicative mood modals, or perhaps indica-
tive mood modals without a restricting clause that determinately fixes a modal base B, e.g. 
'Given what's known.'IS Since the context in some cases plays the same role for bare in-
dicative mood modals as a restricting clause, (plausibly) those indicative mood modals that 
express non-epistemic possibility in virtue of a restricting clause will have analogous bare 
cases where the context fixes a non-epistemic reading. Consider a case where the prejacent 
is in the present tense. 
(71) (a) Given his desire to be on time tomorrow, he may be in bed. 
(b) He's got work tomorrow; he may be in bed. 
Here the indicative mood modal 'Given his desire to be on time tomorrow, he may be 
in bed' expresses bouletic possibility as the restricting clause 'Given his desire to be on 
18 As I argue in section 3.2.2, these later cases are not open to appropriate problematic evaluations. 
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time tomorrow' picks out just those worlds compatible with some desire. With the right 
contextual cues the restricting clause could be dropped; consider: 
(72) Joe just got a new job, but he's got to start at 6 am. 
(73) (a) Ah, well he may be in bed then. 
(b) Ah, he's probably in bed by now. 
To see that (73) expresses the same thing as (71), consider how the speaker could respond 
if corrected: 
(74) Joe just got a new job, but he's got to start at 6 am. 
(75) Ah, well he may be in bed then. 
(76) No, Joe can't be in bed, I just saw him at Boheme. 
(77) (A puzzled look) Sure; I just thought he'd want to be in bed, given the new job.19 
Thus I take it that (73) is an example of a non-epistemic utterance of a bare indicative 
mood modal where the prejacent is in the present tense. But, since bouletic possibilities 
are non-Moorean it is not an example of a Moorean, non-epistemic indicative mood modal 
with the prejacent in the present tense. 
What about a Moorean, non-epistemic indicative mood modal with the prejacent in the 
present tense? The last two examples give the ingredients: the right restricting clause will 
force a circumstantial reading on an indicative mood modal, even if the prejacent is in the 
present tense, and plausibly the right context will force the same circumstantial reading on 
the corresponding bare indicative mood modal. Since circumstantial modals are Moorean, 
this will be a Moorean, non-epistemic indicative mood modal. For example, one could 
simply run The Boston Case C (3.1.1.1) again, this time with Sally saying "He may be in 
Boston," 
Ned: I wonder where Joe is today, he usually doesn't miss lunch. 
Ed: I heard his mother is really sick; she's got the flu. 
Sally: 
(a) That's terrible! He may be in Boston visiting her. 
19 As before, (77) may not be very natural, but it is appropriate-i.e. within the meaning of what is said. 
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(b) That's terrible! Maybe's he's up visiting her in Boston. 
George: No, he can't be. His car is still in the shop. 
What I want to claim is that in this example there is a circumstantial reading of Sally's 
utterance available, although it's also possible to hear an epistemic reading. 
As the above example suggests, the problem with this approach is that when the pre-
jacent is in the present tense it can be difficult to "hear" the circumstantial reading of an 
indicative mood modal, even when there is a restricting clause or the context is doing all it 
can to pick it out. Consider what happens when we try to force the circumstantial reading 
on 'Joe may be in Boston' or 'It's possible that Joe is in Boston' using restricting clauses, 
(78) In view of the circumstances, Joe may be in Boston. 
(79) In view of the circumstances, it's possible that Joe is in Boston. 
The restricting clause 'In view of the circumstances' (just as the context in the example 
above) is supposed to force a circumstantial reading of 'Joe may be in Boston' and 'It's 
possible that Joe is in Boston,' but it's not clear that it does so. First, one could object that 
(78) sounds just like an epistemic modal. (One could object that the context only provides 
the evidence which prompts Sally's claim.) Someone who uttered (78) would be making an 
epistemic modal claim. The restricting clause 'In view of the circumstances' isn't picking 
out the set of worlds compatible with the circumstances as the modal base, but rather is 
pointing to the relevant facts known by the speaker which prompted the assertion in the 
first place. (In fact, there is a broader objection here. One could suggest that restricting 
clauses don't usually function as I've described. Perhaps (70 a,b) sound just as epistemic 
as (69 a,b), the "restricting clauses" not picking out the modal base, but pointing towards 
the known facts which prompted the assertion.) Second, one could object that (79) just 
sounds bad. Hacking, for example, would suggest that (79) is ungrammatical and that it 
should be 'In view of the circumstances, it's possible for Joe to be in Boston.' (So this 
suggests a general limit with the above approach. While 'may' constructions may( <p) are 
flexible enough to change flavor with the addition of a restriction clause, it might be argued 
that possible-that constructions cannot take restricting clauses which would force a non-
epistemic reading.) Lastly, one could object that even if (78), (79) or some similar sentence 
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with a different restricting clause managed to express a circumstantial reading that the 
base indicative mood modal 'Joe may be in Boston' was so easily heard as epistemic that 
no context could do the work of the restricting clause and cancel the epistemic reading. 
The general objection that it's very heard to "hear" certain indicative mood modals as 
anything but epistemic is not a fatal one. It seems correct that certain indicative mood 
modal constructions, e.g. 'He may be in Boston' or 'He might be in Boston,' express 
awkwardly non-epistemic modality, if they do it at all. The most natural way to express 
the circumstantial modal claim that Joe is possibly in Boston is with something like 'Given 
the circumstances, it's possible for Joe to be in Boston,' which of course is not an indicative 
mood modal construction. The objection is not fatal because the claim is not that all 
indicative mood modals are flexible enough to express non-epistemic possibility, but that 
some are, and because the claim is not that non-epistemic readings are the most natural 
readings, but that they are admissible readings. Of course, the best way to meet the 
objection is to find indicative mood modals (with the prejacent in the present tense) which 
are naturally heard as non-epistemic. Consider the following examples. 
(80) He may want an aspirin. 
(81) Given how much he drank last night, he may want an aspirin. 
(82) It's possible that he believes Hesperus is a star. 
(83) It's possible that he believes Hesperus is a star, given that he doesn't know Hesperus 
is Phosphorus. 
(84) He may regret staying out so late. 
(85) He may regret staying out so late, now that he has to be up so early. 
(86) It's possible that he might have cancer. 
(87) It's possible that he might have cancer, given that we don't know the results of the 
filter test. 
The difference between these cases and (78) and (79) is that the prejacents involve propo-
sitional attitudes and other modal terms. I suggest that all of these are easily heard as 
circumstantial. For example, 'He might have cancer' is naturally heard as epistemic, but 
(87) naturally suggests a circumstantial reading: given the circumstances-that a filter test 
was run but we don't know the results yet-the epistemic modal claim that he might have 
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cancer is possibly true, we in fact don't know yet what we know. It actually is difficult to 
hear epistemic readings of the main modal (the outer one which takes widest scope) in the 
above examples, especially (86) and (87). 
The objection that the "restricting clauses" aren't really fixing the modal base, but 
rather giving pragmatic information, seems most salient in cases like (78) where it is difficult 
to hear anything but the epistemic reading. If an indicative mood modal like 'Joe may be 
in Boston' cannot be "heard" as anything but epistemic, then additional restricting clauses 
like in (78) will be heard as giving pragmatic information, e.g. giving the salient known 
facts which prompted the utterance. But in cases like (80) where there is a salient non-
epistemic reading the restricting clause does pick up that reading and fix the modal base, 
e.g. (81). If (80) is uttered in the right context (plausibly) contextual cues can pick out the 
circumstantial reading. 
The extent to which a restricting clause can be used to force non-epistemic readings of 
indicative mood modals seems to depend on the particular modal construction. If Hacking 
is correct, possible-that constructions can never take restricting clauses that would force 
a non-epistemic reading. Constructions involving 'may' are a little more flexible, more 
easily taking non-epistemic readings when the prejacent is either in the future tense or 
itself involves modal terms.20 The claim that all Moorean utterances of indicative mood 
modals with prejacents in the present tense express an epistemic reading is false. When the 
prejacent itself is a present tense modal sentence circumstantial readings of the main modal 
are natural. When an indicative mood modal expresses circumstantial modality as do (80-
87) it is Moorean, since circumstantial modals are Moorean. So these are counterexamples. 
More controversially, we can at least get some distance, I think, with forcing circumstantial 
readings in cases where the prejacent isn't a modal sentence itself. 
3.1.3 A Problem with the Current Approach Many in the current literature on 
"epistemic modals" set out the topic differently from what is done here and in the classical 
literature. For Moore, Hacking, Teller and DeRose the object of study was the sort of 
20This difference between possible-that and 'may' constructions, while not unexpected, calls into question 
the claim that the two are "synonymous." Perhaps the best thing to say is that, e.g., 'It may rain' and 
'It's possible that it will rain' have readings on which they express the same proposition, but the sentences 
themselves are not synonymous insofar as they can express a different range of modalities. 
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possibility expressed by a certain class of grammatical constructions. This perspective is 
reflected in their treatment of the subject: each attempts to justify the name 'epistemic.' 
DeRose in particular takes care to argue that indicative mood modal constructions express 
possibilities which are epistemic as defined in definition 2.1.5.1. Some in the contemporary 
literature, myself included, take this approach. Another contemporary author who falls into 
this camp and also defends a "classical" contextualism is Michael Huemer. The first page 
of his article (2007) rather straightforwardly lays out his project as describing the sort of 
possibility expressed in "ordinary life" by sentences of the form 'It might be that P.' Unlike 
DeRose though, Huemer "assume[sJ that sentences of the form 'It might be that P' ... 
typically ascribe epistemic possibility." (2007, 119) Other contemporary researchers, such 
as Andy Egan (2007, 1-2) and Seth Yalcin (2007, 983), are less careful to delineate their 
subject, but appear to take the same approach. 
But some in the current literature take a different approach.21 Tamina Stephenson, 
for example, defines 'epistemic modals' as those modals expressing whichever reading of 
English modals is epistemic. She introduces her topic by saying, 
It is widely assumed that (la) has a reading (its epistemic reading) which can 
be expressed as something like (lb) (Kratzer, 1977). 
(1) (a) It might be raining. 
(b) In some world compatible with what is known in the actual world, it's 
raining. 
(Stephenson, 2007, 487) 
Von Fintel and Gillies, in both their research and expositions, give similar semantic char-
acterizations of 'epistemic modal.' (von Fintel and Gillies, 2011; 2008a; von Fintel, 2006) 
The idea is that there is some reading for modals like 'It's possible that <p' which is epis-
temic on definition 2.1.5.1 and the object of study is the truth conditions for this reading. 
Another contemporary author, John MacFarlane, seems to take this approach as well. He 
says, "By 'epistemic modals,' I mean epistemic uses of modal words: adverbs like 'neces-
sarily,' 'possibly,' and 'probably,' adjectives like 'necessary,' 'possible,' and 'probably,' and 
auxiliaries like 'might,' 'may,' 'must,' and 'could'." (MacFarlane, 2011) As the last quote 
21 An approach taken, as the following quote indicates, by at least some contemporaries of Hacking. 
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indicates, contemporary authors are usually much more promiscuous about which lexical 
items they consider. Hacking et al. generally stick to 'may' and possible-that when looking 
for examples of modals with epistemic readings. Egan and MacFarlane let in items like 
'probably' and 'could. ,22 
As has been shown over the last few sections, these criteria do not line up. Every epis-
temic modal is an indicative mood construction-assuming the prejacent is in the present 
tense. But not every indicative mood modal is epistemic. Not every sentence with 'may' 
or possible-that has only epistemic readings. (Or rather, not every utterance of such a sen-
tence expresses an epistemic reading.) Sentences involving 'probably' and 'could' also have 
non-epistemic readings. 23 There is a difficulty which arises from this disconnect between 
the grammatical and semantic criteria. Everyone agrees that there is a use of sentences like 
'It's possible that it's raining' and 'It may be raining' on which they express some sort of 
epistemic possibility. The project is to describe the truth conditions for this particular use 
and proposals are checked against a variety of linguistic data such as the examples in section 
2. But since expressions like 'It may be raining' can also express other flavors of possibility 
that aren't epistemic not every example of, say, an utterance of an indicative mood modal is 
data on the epistemic reading.24 In the example the utterance must actually be expressing, 
in its context, the epistemic reading. For example, cases where (71) or (80) are uttered are 
not cases which should be considered when trying to describe the truth conditions of the 
epistemic reading of indicative mood modals. 
So the problem is that in any putative case of an epistemic modal it must actually be 
checked that the utterance (of the Moorean indicative mood modal or whichever grammat-
ical criteria one has in mind) is expressing the epistemic reading, or that other conversation 
partners are evaluating the epistemic reading. This is a problem because while some cases 
clearly are ones which express the epistemic reading and others not, it is certainly not clear 
22Hacking himself would probably not object, as he saw 'probably' as a term which should be substitutable 
for 'possible that' in sentences which expressed the epistemic reading. 
230ther distinctions we could draw seem to fall as follows. Every epistemic modal is Moorean, but not every 
Moorean modal is epistemic. Every Moorean modal is an indicative mood construction-again assuming 
the prejacent is in the present tense-but not every indicative mood construction is Moorean. Not every 
use of 'may,' 'might,' 'probably' or 'likely' is Moorean (resp. epistemic), and obviously not every Moorean 
(resp. epistemic) modal involves 'may,' 'might,' 'probably' or 'likely.' 
24Likewise, since not every every Moorean utterance of a modal is epistemic, not even every example of a 
Moorean utterance of a modal is data on the epistemic reading. 
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in many cases that this is so. The "problematic cases" as defined in definition 2.2.3.4 are 
cases in point. It is not clear that it is the epistemic reading which is being expressed 
in these cases, in part because there is no single epistemic state which accounts for the 
example. 
The second objection at the end of section 3.1.1 was that an argument isn't needed 
to show that the utterance in problematic examples expressed the epistemic reading. It 
simply is obvious or intuitively clear, so the objection goes, that, e.g., "Joe may be in 
Boston" expresses the epistemic reading. But while it's obvious or intuitively clear that 
the utterances in problematic examples have an epistemic reading, they also have non-
epistemic readings. This objection fails then because although it's intuitively clear that the 
utterances have epistemic readings, it's not intuitively clear that the utterances are open to 
(appropriate) problematic evaluations on their epistemic readings or that it is the epistemic 
reading which is being expressed and evaluated in the problematic examples. In fact, as the 
considerations at the end of section 2 it is prima facie false. 
Thus the relativist's arguments have the potential to simply misfire. The target is the 
epistemic reading, but a given example may actually not involve the epistemic reading at all. 
This is what in the next section (3.2) I argue has happened in the debate over relativism 
and the problematic examples. Relativist arguments from problematic examples misfire. 
The target, of course, is the epistemic reading, but the utterances in problematic cases do 
not express that reading in a straightforward way. 
3.2 Explaining Problematic Examples 
3.2.1 Hacking's Observation In section 2 it was argued that the most straightfor-
ward conclusion to draw from the lack of an epistemic state which makes sense of all the 
responses in problematic examples such as The Boston Case A and B (examples 2.2.1.1, 
2.2.1.2) and the Bond in Zurich example (example 2.2.1.3) was that these cases aren't epis-
temic. (After all, if they were must there not be some epistemic state and a corresponding 
modal base?) In section 3.1 it was argued that none of the usual arguments for establishing 
that some epistemic reading is correct for some indicative mood modals run in the case when 
the example is problematic. As the last section argued, although it's intuitively clear that 
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there are epistemic readings for the utterances in problematic examples, it's not intuitively 
clear that problematic evaluations are appropriate on those epistemic readings. In this sec-
tion (3.2.1) I give a positive argument that the cases are not epistemic. The observation 
made here, what I call Hacking's observation, suggests that they are circumstantial. 
Recall Hacking's example of the salvage ship, example 2.1.3.3. The mate says "It's 
possible that the wreck is in these waters," but according to the log the ship was nowhere 
near the location the mate said it might be. The captain, on examining the log, sees this 
and exclaims, "The wreck couldn't have been here!" The intuition is that the captain has 
spoken correctly. The mate, it seems, was wrong. The wreck couldn't have been where he 
said it might be. Hacking's suggestion, tacitly assuming that the mate's utterance expresses 
epistemic modality, is that it is because a practicable investigation would have lead the mate 
to know that the ship isn't in those waters that the mate spoke falsely. But the real key 
to this example, I suggest, is simply that the ship was nowhere near the location the mate 
referred to when it sank. It is impossible for the wreck to be where the mate said it could 
be because, as the log shows, the ship wasn't in that area before it sank. That the ship's 
last location is recorded in the log and that someone could come to know the last location 
by properly examining the log are red herrings. To see this, consider a second version of 
the example. 
Example 3.2.1.1. The Salvage Worker (Revised). There is a salvage crew searching 
for a sunken ship. The mate of the salvage ship, after looking through what meager evidence 
is available, says, 
(88) Mate: It's possible that the wreck is in these waters. 
But it turns out in fact that when the ship sank it was nowhere near those waters. The mate 
learns this a few weeks later, after logs have been better reviewed, survivors interviewed 
and the wreck is finally found. The mate says, 
(89) Mate: I was wrong, the wreck couldn't have been there! 
Indeed; it seems that even if the location of the ship's sinking was never discovered the 
mate still would have spoken falsely. It sounds correct to say that if the ship didn't sink 
anywhere near these waters, then its impossible for it's wreck to be there. o 
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The claim is that objective factors, i.e. that the ship was nowhere near that location when 
it sank, really do matter to the truth of the mate's claim. Note also how easily the example 
is turned into a problematic case: 
Example 3.2.1.2. The Salvage Worker (Problematic). There is a salvage crew search-
ing for a sunken ship. The mate of the salvage ship is meeting with the captain and after 
looking through what meager evidence he has, says, 
(90) Mate: It's possible that the wreck is in these waters. 
(91) Captain: No, it can't be in those waters. The log clearly shows that the ship wasn't 
near there when it went down. 0 
There is a similarity between problematic cases and cases, such as The Salvage Worker 
(2.1.3.3) and unlike The Doting Grandmother (2.1.3.6), which seem to require practicable 
investigations or epistemic reach.25 Just like it seems that objective facts are what make the 
mate's claim false, it also seems that objective facts are at play in the problematic examples. 
Consider The Boston Case B. Here you, the reader, are a kibitzer who overhears Sally's 
utterance "He may be in Boston." You know, by supposition, that Joe isn't in Boston, 
you just saw him down the hall here in Berkeley. Given the set up, most people seem to 
evaluate Sally's utterance as false. But it seems to me that the fact that you the kibitzer 
know that Joe isn't in Boston is irrelevant. Imagine the example was run so that neither 
you nor Sally nor anyone in the conversation know that Joe is still here in Berkeley. But 
suppose he is, in fact, still here in Berkeley. Given this set up, is it possible for Joe to be 
in Boston? Can Sally truly say "Joe may be in Boston"? It seems to me that she cannot. 
It is impossible for Joe to be in Boston, if in fact he's in Berkeley.26 One way to put the 
observation is that it just sounds correct, in English, to say that if Joe's in Berkeley, then 
he can't be in Boston. 
25MacFarlane, in (2011), also points out this similarity. Obviously, though, he does not draw the conclusion, 
drawn just above, that the objective facts really do matter. 
26To be more formal, the feeling is that what makes (37) false is not that there does not exist a world w, 
consistent with what the kibitzer knows, in which 'Joe is in Boston' is true. Rather what seems to make (37) 
false is that there does not exist a world w, consistent with the fact that Joe is in Berkeley, in which 'Joe is 
in Boston' is true. That is, the modal base B that is relevant for the evaluation of (37) is the set of worlds 
consistent with the fact that Joe is in Berkeley, not the set of worlds consistent with what the kibitzer, or 
anyone else, knows. I should note that although I have no rigorous empirical data, this is a common response 
I get from colleagues. They say that sure, Sally has spoken falsely. But the idea is usually that what make's 
Sally's utterance false is that Joe's still here in Berkeley, not that they, supposedly, know this. 
64 
So examples where "objective facts" seem relevant are easily turned into problematic 
examples and problematic examples, arguably, are cases where "objective facts" seem rele-
vant. What I in this section call Hacking's observation is the simple observation that in 
some cases, specifically the problematic ones, objective facts seem relevant. My suggestion 
is just as we should take seriously that problematic cases are cases where there are ap-
parently no epistemic modal bases which resolve the contextual indeterminacy, we should 
also take seriously that problematic cases are cases where objective facts seem relevant. 
Instead of accounting for the seeming relevance of objective facts by appeal to practicable 
investigations or epistemic reach, I suggest that these cases are ones where the truth of the 
utterance does depend on objective facts, i.e. on the circumstances, and not on what the 
speakers know about the circumstances.27 
It's important to note that Hacking's observation isn't trivial. There are certainly cases 
where objective factors don't seem relevant. Teller's example of the doting grandmother 
(2.1.3.6) is one case in point. The doting grandmother's utterance "It's possible it will be 
a boy, it's possible it will be a girl. Should I buy blue or pink?" seems okay even on the 
supposition that, say, it's actually a boy. This, in fact, seems to be a major motivation for 
taking Hacking's observation seriously. Hacking's truth conditions for Moorean indicative 
mood modals, recall, require that practicable investigations or epistemic reach always be 
taken into account. Teller's example of the doting grandmother shows that objective factors 
aren't always relevant. DeRose attempts to fix the problem by stipulating that practicable 
investigations or "ways of coming to know" only be taken into account if they are relevant. 
The problem with this suggestion is that it's just difficult to set out when epistemic reach 
27 Although Hacking himself doesn't make this jump, it's interesting that some of his own descriptions are 
suggestive of it. Recall the quote given at the end of section 2.1.1. Hacking says, "It is not possible that there 
are two hundred armchairs in my room as I write these notes, for I am sitting here in these cramped quarters 
and can see perfectly well that there are only three or four chairs altogether." (1967, 145-146) Why is it 
impossible that there are two hundred armchairs in Hacking's room? Because in fact there are only three or 
four chairs altogether. It's also worth noting that Seth Yalcin seems to make a similar observation, although 
again he interprets it under the tacit assumption that the modality is epistemic. He opens his paper (2007) 
by pointing out that sentences such as 'It is raining and it might not be raining' and 'It isn't raining and 
it might be raining' sound terrible, especially when 'might' carries the reading it does when Sally says "Joe 
might be in Boston." Presumably sentences like 'Joe is in Berkeley and he might be in Boston' where the 
prejacent of the modal, second conjunct implies the negation of the non-modal, first conjunct sound just as 
bad. But of course the negation of 'If Joe is in Berkeley, then he can't be in Boston' is a sentence of just 
this form. Since 'Joe is in Berkeley and he may be in Boston' sounds bad we would expect something which 
which contradicted it to sound natural. Indeed, if Joe is in Berkeley, then he can't be in Boston. 
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is relevant and when it's not. As von Fintel and Gillies say regarding defining "practicable" 
investigations in a way which fits the data, "Consulting Schmolmes's interview notes can 
count, as can ships logs (Hacking), and medical test results in a sealed envelope (DeRose). 
But performing a baby gender test does not, and apparently, neither does looking behind 
curtains or in a car. The project of gerrymandering epistemic reach to fit these boundaries 
has all the hallmarks of a project we don't want to take up." (von Fintel and Gillies, 2011, 7) 
But by taking Hacking's observation seriously the problem just disappears. In The Boston 
Case A (and B), The Salvage Worker, and The Crooked Lottery the modality expressed 
by the speakers really is such that the truth of the utterance depends on objective factors, 
while in cases like the The Doting Grandmother the modality expressed by the speakers 
isn't. As was discussed above, Moorean indicative mood modals can express different flavors 
of modalities-sometimes circumstantial and sometimes epistemic. In cases where objective 
factors seem relevant we have a circumstantial modal, and in cases where they don't we have 
an epistemic modal. There's no need to explain why some epistemic modals are sensitive 
to "epistemic reach" and others not. 
Now those who want to defend the epistemic reading can make two moves. The first is 
to argue that the tendency to say, e.g., that it is that Joe is in Berkeley which makes the 
modal claim false and not your knowledge of it comes from a difficulty in taking an objective 
perspective. It's difficult to assume that Joe is in Berkeley and evaluate the modal claim 
as if you did not know it. (Indeed, your supposition that Joe is in Berkeley is background 
against which you evaluate the claim and evaluating something against a supposition is very 
much like evaluating something against what you know.) The second move is to point out 
that if Joe being in Berkeley did imply that he couldn't be in Boston then the modality is 
in danger of becoming trivia1.28 We would have that Joe may be in Boston if and only if 
he is in Boston! 
The first objection is not that it is unnatural to say things like "If Joe is in Berkeley, 
then he can't be in Boston" or to deny that it seems like Sally's utterance is false if Joe is in 
Berkeley, but to deny that we can reliably read off truth conditions from this observation. 
The criticism is a criticism about how fine grain our linguistic intuitions are. A direct way 
28This is a point made by Yalcin in his discussion of this observation. 
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to respond is simply to deny that our linguistic intuitions are as coarse as the objection 
supposes. After all, the observation is not a trivial one. The observation doesn't hold in The 
Doting Grandmother example. If intuitions were that coarse it would seem that one should 
judge the grandmother's utterance as false when they suppose that the unborn child is, say, 
female. 29 Even supposing that the unborn child is a girl it still seems like the grandmother, 
who doesn't know the sex, can truly say "It may be a boy." But a second, tangential, way to 
respond is that taking Hacking's observation seriously and assuming that Sally's utterance 
is circumstantial leads to a nice explanation of why practicable investigations or "objective 
factors" seem relevant in some cases but not in others. It is that the utterances actually are 
circumstantial in The Boston Case A or The Salvage Worker case which explains why we 
hear them as false when we suppose the circumstances are such that the prejacent isn't true, 
while similar suppositions don't lead to similar denials in The Doting Grandmother example 
or the Suzy-on-the-Bus case because there the utterance does express the epistemic reading. 
Those who want to stick to the epistemic story, whether they're relativists or contextualists, 
need to explain the difference. 30 
But the second objection-that explaining the seeming relevance of objective facts by 
opting for a circumstantial reading trivializes the modality-is much more pressing. If the 
utterance "Joe may be in Boston" is expressing a circumstantial reading, i.e., if objective 
facts are relevant to its truth, the question is with respect to what set of circumstances is 
the utterance expressing a possibility? If it's uttered at a time when Joe is in Berkeley, 
then the circumstances of Joe being in Berkeley seem relevant. But the same considerations 
which lead us to consider Joe being in Berkeley as relevant to the truth of "Joe may be in 
Boston" seem to rule in lots of other circumstances as relevant to the truth of the modal 
claim. For example, if Joe is in Houston, then those circumstances would also prevent him 
29If intuitions are not sharp on the grandmother case, consider Hawthorne's Suzy-on-the-Bus example. Here 
it seems that John, who isn't on the bus, can truly say "I may be on the Bus." 
30The relativist's problem is a bit different. The relativist, of course, explains the problematic cases or the 
seeming relevance of "objective facts" by saying that in each case each person is evaluating the claim based 
on what they know. The problem that objective facts don't always seem relevant, for the relativist, is the 
problem that people don't always evaluate the Moorean indicative mood modal claims of others based on 
what they know. So the contextualist must explain why what's within epistemic reach doesn't always count, 
while the relativist must complicate his story and allow that not all utterances of Moorean indicative mood 
modals are relative. But then, just like the contextualist, we can press and ask for the difference between 
those cases that are relative and those that aren't. The circumstantial proposal is a salient theoretical story 
that answers this question. 
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from being in Boston. Continuing this reasoning, Joe being anywhere but Boston would 
make 'Joe may be in Boston' false. Although it seems right to say that if Joe is in Berkeley, 
then he can't be in Boston, it seems false that "Joe may be in Boston" is true only if Joe is 
in Boston. Even if there is a reasonable way to define the circumstantial modal expressed 
by "Joe may be in Boston" which doesn't trivialize the modality, there is a danger that 
on this circumstantial reading Sally's utterance is unjustified. For example, if Joe being in 
Berkeley rules out the possibility of him being in Boston, then Sally shouldn't utter "Joe 
may be in Boston" if she doesn't know whether he's in Berkeley. The suggestion for dealing 
with this problem, developed in section 3.2.3, is that although Sally's utterance "Joe may 
be in Boston" expresses this strong circumstantial reading, it's actually ambiguous and also 
expresses an epistemic reading. 
3.2.2 The Argument from Retraction Above it was argued that Hacking's observa-
tion suggests that problematic examples aren't cases where the modal expresses an epistemic 
reading. The observation suggests rather that they are cases where the modal expresses 
a circumstantial reading. In this section I argue that utterances which express just the 
epistemic reading are not open to appropriate problematic evaluations. The question the 
argument focuses on is when retractions can be forced. Recall from the first half of section 
2.2.3 that the main argument for the appropriateness of problematic evaluations in prob-
lematic cases is that they force retractions. In the problematic cases it is the circumstantial 
reading which drives the evaluations and forces the retraction. Sally is forced to retract her 
claim in The Boston Case A, for example, because if Joe is in Berkeley then he can't be in 
Boston. This feature of problematic cases-that objective facts seem to matter-drives the 
retractions and is lacking in cases where the utterance only expresses an epistemic read-
ing. Since, as I suggest, nothing else could drive retractions in these cases they cannot be 
problematic. 
Begin by contrasting three sorts of cases: clear cases of epistemic modals where retrac-
tions can't be forced, clear cases of epistemic modals where retractions can be forced and the 
problematic cases. As discussed in section 2.2.3 cases such as The Cancer Test (examples 
2.1.3.9 and 2.1.3.10) where the context determinately picks out an epistemic state as the 
modal base are good examples of epistemic modals where retractions cannot forced. The 
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speaker, Jane, can appropriately defend their claim by pointing back to the bit of context 
which picked out the epistemic state, so long as such a defense is appropriate given the 
contextually determined epistemic state. If Sally says "Joe may be in Boston" in a con-
text which somehow picks out what she knows as the relevant epistemic state and excludes 
what George knows, like in The Boston Case D (3.1.1.2), then she can defend her claim 
by pointing back to the context. But, if she says it in a context which somehow picks out 
what's known by both her and George, then George can force a retraction. Clear cases of 
epistemic modals where retractions can be forced thus are cases where the context picks 
out an epistemic state which includes what is known by the person forcing the retraction. 
Ed asks "Do you guys know where Joe is?" and Sally responds "He may be in Boston." 
George though just saw Joe down the hall, here in Berkeley. He says "No, he can't be in 
Boston, I just saw him down the hall an hour ago." Supposing that the context was such 
so that Sally's utterance expressed something like given what George and I know, he may 
be in Boston, Sally will be forced to retract her claim. 
Clear cases where the utterance expresses the epistemic reading are cases where the 
context determinately picks out an epistemic state as determining the modal base. When 
that epistemic state does not include what's known by a potential evaluator, the evaluator 
cannot force a retraction. When that epistemic state does include what's known by a 
potential evaluator, they can. As I have argued above, problematic cases are different. 
Here evaluators can force retractions because it seems that the truth of what's said depends 
on objective facts. The question is whether we can ever have a case where an utterance 
expresses an epistemic reading which is open to appropriate problematic evaluations. When 
the utterance is epistemic in virtue of the context determinately picking an epistemic state 
it is not open to appropriate problematic evaluations. The cases of interest then are the 
case when the context does the work of a nondeterminate restricting clause such as 'given 
what's known,' or cases like 'Fermat's last theorem may be true' where the prejacent is either 
logically necessary or impossible. Call these non-specific epistemic modal utterances: 
they are utterances of Moorean indicative mood modals which express an epistemic reading 
without specifying a specific epistemic state. 
An immediate point to make is that if these cases are open to appropriate problematic 
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evaluations, and hence the speaker is forced to retract their claim, they're not open to them 
in virtue of Hacking's observation. Sally is forced to retract (34) in The Boston Case A, 
for example, because it seems as if Joe being in Berkeley makes the utterance false. But in 
a case where someone essentially says "Given what's known, Joe may be in Boston" it is 
false that Joe being in Berkeley makes the utterance false. Joe could be in Berkeley even 
if given what's known he may be in Boston. Likewise for 'Goldbach's conjecture may be 
true.' Supposing that Goldbach's conjecture is in fact false, I can still right now truly say 
"Goldbach's conjecture may be true." 
I conjecture that there's nothing else which could force retractions in these two sorts of 
cases. Before gesturing at an argument for this conjecture, consider what is probably the 
most obvious potential counterexample. 
Tim: Fermat's last theorem may be false. 
Tony: No, it isn't. Wiles finished the proof years ago. 
Tim: Oh, okay. 
Here we have an epistemic modal and an apparent retraction. It is a clear case of an 
epistemic modal where the context does not determinately pick out an epistemic state, 
although we could venture some guesses. So is this not a case of a non-specific epistemic 
modal utterance where a retraction is forced? If so, then it's a problematic example where 
the utterance does express epistemic modality. 
The first thing to say about the example is that it's not in quite the same form as the 
typical problematic cases. Tony does not reply "No, it can't be," rather he says "No, it 
isn't." Here Tony is ostensibly denying the prejacent, not the modal claim itself. Trying 
to run the result with "No, it can't be" gets awkward results, or so it sounds to me. It 
sounds better for Tony to say "No, it isn't" rather than "No, it can't be." Given that 
Tony's ostensibly denying the prejacent Tim's response "Oh, okay" doesn't come through 
as a retraction either. In fact it doesn't sound so bad for Tim to mount a defense: 
Tim: Fermat's last theorem may be false. 
Tony: No, it isn't. Wiles finished the proof years ago. 
Tim: 
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(a) Oh, I didn't know that. 
(b) Well it might be true, but given what I knew it might have been false. 
So I first suggest that in Goldbach/Fermat cases where the prejacent is a logical necessity 
or impossibility the natural thing to do for third-parties in the know is simply to affirm or 
deny the prejacent and not to evaluate the modal claim itself. When they do try to deny 
the speaker's utterance, the speaker can defend their utterance and not retract. Thus these 
are not good candidates for problematic cases. 
It is a bit more difficult to gather intuitions on the case when the context does the work 
of a nondeterminate restricting clause because it is difficult to find clear examples where 
the context does this. One way to approach the problem is to just consider cases where 
the speaker uses a nondeterminate restricting clause. Plausibly the responses which are 
appropriate in this case will likewise be appropriate when the context does similar work. 
Sally: Given what's known, Joe may be in Boston. 
George: No, he can't be. I just saw him down the hall an hour ago here in Berkeley. 
Sally: 
(a) Oh, okay then. 
(b) Fine, he can't be, but I still stand by what I said. 
(c) Look, maybe he isn't, but given what I knew he might have been. 
?? 
?? 
?? 
In the face of George's apparent denial, which of these responses from Sally is appropriate? 
I have a hard time hearing (b), but (a) and (c) seem to go through better. What are Sally's 
options? She can be pragmatic, say (a) and accept George's information and move on, or be 
stubborn and go with (c). It "feels" as if there's enough wiggle room in the locution 'given 
what's known' for Sally to fall back on the epistemic reading which considers only what she 
knows. As von Fintel and Gillies suggest, the option is available for the speaker to simply 
be stubborn without displaying linguistic incompetence. (That is, (c) is appropriate.) I 
conclude that when there is no circumstantial reading available to drive the retraction it is 
less clear that George can force Sally to retract. 
3.2.3 Semantic Ambiguity and the Circumstantial Reading But if the prob-
lematic examples aren't cases where the utterance expresses the epistemic reading, what is 
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being expressed? Hacking's observation discussed in section 3.2.1 suggests that they are cir-
cumstantial. The idea there was that what made Sally's utterance "Joe may be in Boston" 
false was that Joe was in Berkeley. If Joe is in Berkeley, then it's false that he may be 
in Boston if 'may' takes the same reading as in the original utterance. But the problem 
with this proposal is that it seems to trivialize the modality expressed by the utterances in 
problematic examples. If 'may' or 'possible that' express circumstantial modality in these 
examples then they are expressing a rather strong sort of circumstantial modality. On this 
reading of 'may,' Joe may be in Boston if and only if he is in Boston. But it just doesn't 
seem like what is being said by Sally collapses to the claim that Joe is in Boston.31 It seems 
that Sally can truly say that Joe may be in Boston even if he's not. The other problem with 
this conclusion is that it seems to make Sally's claim unjustified. Sally, by assumption, does 
not know where Joe is. So if her utterance "He may be in Boston" is true just in case he 
is in Boston it would be unjustified. Sally shouldn't assert propositions she doesn't know 
or isn't reasonably sure about. But Sally's utterance does seem justified, it is appropriate. 
No one would question Sally's semantic competence for saying that Joe may be in Boston 
when she isn't sure whether he is. 
So here's the situation: Hacking's observation suggests the circumstantial reading. In-
deed the circumstantial reading seems to explain best why utterances in problematic ex-
amples are evaluated as they are by kibitzers. But the circumstantial reading supported 
by Hacking's observation is rather strong. It trivializes the modality and makes Sally's 
utterance unjustified. This is where the epistemic reading is so natural. If Sally's utterance 
expresses something about her epistemic state then the modality is neither trivial nor un-
justified. Sally is perfectly capable of judging whether what she knows rules out Joe being 
in Boston. A natural suggestion seems to be that Sally's utterance is ambiguous in some 
sense.32 Both the circumstantial and epistemic readings are available. The availability of 
31 As discussed in section 2.2.2, this is a problem for expressivism. Expressivism holds that 'Joe may be in 
Boston' is true if and only if Joe is in Boston, that the modal 'may' expresses something about the speaker's 
disposition towards the prejacent. But it does seem as if Sally can truly say "Joe may be in Boston" even 
in some cases where he's not. 
32Note the difference: the point of section 3.1 was to argue that sentences like 'Joe may be in Boston' are 
ambiguous between various readings of the form 'Given ... , Joe may be in Boston.' But perhaps the 
context of an utterance of such an ambiguous sentence in fact fixes a certain reading. Then an utterance of 
an ambiguous sentence would non-ambiguously express a proposition. The claim here now is that at least 
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the epistemic reading makes the utterance a natural and justified one. The availability of 
the circumstantial reading explains kibitzer's evaluations. 
Before trying to fill out the picture just sketched, consider what other reasons there are 
for thinking that the utterances of indicative mood modals in problematic examples are in 
some way ambiguous. Von Fintel and Gillies, in (2011), also argue that there is a sense in 
which the utterances in problematic examples are ambiguous. They motivate their claim by 
pointing out that problematic examples are examples where the context does not do much 
semantic work. As they say, "The canon [contextualism] requires contexts to do more than 
they in fact do: a context in which a BEM [bare epistemic modal] is deployed need not, it 
seems, fully determine a relevant group of agents. This is more feature than bug, though, 
generating ambiguity as-if by design." (von Fintel and Gillies, 2011, 15) But my claim is 
stronger than von Fintel and Gillies's claim. They see the context of problematic cases as 
being indeterminate between competing epistemic states, tacitly holding that the utterance 
still expresses only an epistemic reading, while I argue that the context in these cases is also 
indeterminate between epistemic and circumstantial readings. It's not just that the context 
fails to pick out a particular epistemic state as the modal base of the utterance, it fails to 
pick out the modal base as being the set of worlds compatible with some epistemic state. 
Kent Bach, in (2011), also thinks there is ambiguity to the utterances in problematic 
cases. Bach's claim though is stronger than mine in some respects. Bach argues that all 
bare modal sentences are ambiguous and denies that that context of utterance is the sort of 
thing which resolves these ambiguities. Thus all utterances of bare indicative mood modals 
fail to express propositions, i.e. are themselves ambiguous between a number of readings.33 
Bach motivates this claim by contrasting bare modal sentences with those with restricting 
clauses. Since bare sentences lack restricting clauses, plausibly their semantic content lacks 
something as well, so his argument goes. (Bach, 2011, 2,12) While I deny that all utterances 
in problematic cases, the context fails to fix a reading and so the utterance itself is ambiguous. 
33Bach does not share some of the basic assumptions of this thesis. He says, "It will immediately be objected 
that the radical invariantist claim about bare EP [epistemic possibility] sentences is obvious but irrelevant: 
of course bare EP sentences do not express propositions-utterances of them do-and the puzzle is about 
utterances, not the sentences themselves. Moreover, so the objection goes, not sentences but utterances are 
the primary linguistic items that have propositional or truth-conditional contents, and it is the business of 
semantics to give a systematic account of the truth-conditions of what utterance express .... In my view, ... 
the project of utterance semantics is misguided. For reasons that I can only hint at here, linguistic semantics 
concerns sentences, not utterances." (Bach, 2011, 14) 
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of bare modal sentences are ambiguous-I do tend to think that often the context can do 
the same work as a restricting clause-I think the contrast between bare and not bare cases 
does help motivate the case for ambiguity. For example, in The Boston Case A Sally utters 
sentence (92). Imagine instead that in this case Sally instead uttered (93) or (94). 
(92) Joe may be in Boston. 
(93) In view of what I know, Joe may be in Boston. [epistemic] 
(94) Given his mother's illness, Joe may be in Boston. [circumstantial] 
Even given the context of the utterance in the Boston Case A, there seems to be semantic 
content in the latter two revised cases which is missing in the original: in the latter two 
a modal base is determined, while in contrast there doesn't seem to be any modal base 
determined in the original. In the original case did Sally say something more like she would 
have said had she uttered (93) or more like what she would have said had she uttered (94)7 
But I think the best way to motivate the claim that utterances in problematic examples 
are ambiguous is to consider the way in which the utterances can be evaluated.34 Consider 
again The Boston Case A. It seems perfectly natural for George, knowing that Joe is 
in Berkeley, to say (35). But other more charitable responses seem appropriate as well. 
Consider an alternative way the dialog might go: 
(95) Ed: I wonder where Joe is today. 
(96) Sally: He may be in Boston. 
(97) George: 
(a) What do you mean Sally, I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley.35 
(b) Well given what I know he can't be-I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley. 
(c) Maybe given what you know, but I just saw him an hour ago here in Berkeley. 
All of these responses by George sound almost as natural as (35) where George fiat out 
denies Sally's utterance. But, each of these responses respects the epistemic reading. The 
first, (97 a), suggests that there are multiple readings of Sally's utterance, possibly some 
34This observation is at least close in spirit to some others that Bach uses to motivate his claims. For example, 
Bach notes that in a case like The Boston Case A what Sally says leaves room for her to clarify her intention: 
"Joe may be in Boston, I mean, at least I don't know anything to the contrary." (Bach, 2011, 3) 
35Here "what do you mean" is supposed to be heard as the charitable "could you clarify," not the uncharitable 
"huh?" 
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of which would be true. The next, (97 b), doesn't sound like a flat out denial of Sally's 
utterance. Here George is making a distinct, non-bare indicative mood modal claim. The 
last, (97 c), explicitly acknowledges the epistemic reading of Sally's utterance. Since all 
of these-(35 and 97 a-c)-seem equally natural and they are apparently responding to 
different propositions there is ambiguity in Sally's utterance.36 
So it seems that there is some ambiguity in the utterances of problematic examples. 
Both circumstantial and epistemic readings are "available," in some sense. But precisely 
what sort of ambiguity is involved? What is the cause of the ambiguity? First, it's clear 
that it's not a grammatical ambiguity. There is no way to parse a sentence like 'Joe may be 
in Boston' to eliminate the ambiguity in Sally's utterance (34). The ambiguity is in some 
sense due to the indeterminate context. There are some contexts in which Sally's utterance 
of 'Joe may be in Boston' is not ambiguous, e.g. (51) in The Boston Case D. The idea, in 
line with Bach, is of course that the sentence 'Joe may be in Boston' is ambiguous between 
readings of the form Given ... , Joe may be in Boston, and that often times the context 
resolves the ambiguity by doing the work of a restricting clause. What I suggest then is that 
problematic cases like The Boston Case A are examples where the context does enough work 
to pick out a few salient readings, but not enough to distinguish between them. Roughly 
put, Sally's utterance (34) seems to be ambiguous between 
(98) Given what I know, Joe may be in Boston. 
(99) Given the relevant circumstances, Joe may be in Boston. 
and possibly a few other readings.37 The ambiguity in the utterance is an ambiguity with 
respect to which proposition is being expressed. 38 
But even admitting that there is some ambiguity in the utterances of problematic cases 
it is still left to explain why Sally makes this ambiguous utterance and why George, or 
361 must admit though that intuitions on this differ. 1 hear each of (97 a~c) as natural and even appropriate 
things for George to say. Von Fintel and Gillies seem to deny that they are though. Changing their example 
slightly, they deny that George could appropriately respond to Sally by saying "OK, but I know that they're 
not there." (von Fintel and Gillies, 2011, 13,19) I simply disagree, I do not hear anything awkward about 
this. 
37Perhaps if the context was filled in just a bit more, for example if it was common knowledge among Ed, Sally 
and George that Joe needed to make a trip to Boston, the restricting clauses would reflect those specifics. 
Then maybe one possible reading would be that Joe may be in Boston, given his need for such a trip. 
38 And of course this ambiguity is not resolved-in making the utterance the speaker fails to unambiguously 
assert any definite proposition. 
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a kibitzer, evaluates it the way he does in the example. It would be nice to give specific 
assert ability conditions and to tell some story about exactly what Sally expresses in ut-
tering (34). But for my primary claim-that the problematic evaluations in problematic 
examples are best seen as responses to the availability of the circumstantial reading, and 
hence not good data for the epistemic reading-the details of such a story do not matter. 39 
For example, I believe both Bach's radical invariantism and von Fintel and Gillies cloudy 
contextualism could be adapted as ways to fill in the details of the story sketched above. 
Consider von Fintel and Gillies cloudy contextualism. Recall from section 2.2.2 their 
notion of "putting a proposition into play." For each utterance of a bare indicative mood 
modal with prejacent <P in a problematic example the context Cu fails to determine an 
(epistemic) modal base B. The facts up until the time of utterance allow for the context 
Cu to be resolved in multiple ways, each way determining some group G which fixes an 
(epistemic) modal base B. Then we say that the utterance "puts into play" all of the modal 
propositions Q(Bi)(<p) where Bi is a modal base associated with some group G i picked out 
by one of the resolutions of cu. This story could be amended to the present picture in an 
obvious way. The claim now would be that for each utterance of a bare indicative mood 
modal with prejacent <p in a problematic example the context Cu fails to determine a modal 
base B. The facts up until the time of utterance allow for the context Cu to be resolved in 
multiple ways, some of which actually pick out epistemic modal bases and some of which pick 
out circumstantial modal bases B, i.e. modal bases B which are all the worlds compatible 
with some set of circumstances. Again we would say that the utterance "puts into play" 
all of the modal propositions Q(Bi)(<p) where Bi is a modal base, possibly epistemic and 
possibly circumstantial, picked out by one of the resolutions of cu. 
We can then use von Fintel and Gillies's story about assert ability and evaluation. A 
speaker can utter a bare indicative mood modal if and only if they are justified in asserting 
at least one of the modal propositions put into play by the utterance.40 Likewise, both 
conversation partners and kibitzers, we say, will tend to evaluate the utterance by evaluating 
39The thrust of my claim is very similar to the thrust of Hawthorne's. He concludes (2007) by saying, "It is 
enough for my purposes if there is a danger-theoretic use of modals that cannot be analyzed in terms of the 
epistemic state of groups of agents, and that this generates readings that explain much of the eavesdropping 
data with which we began." 
40 Note that this definition will still work when the context is determinate. 
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whichever proposition put into play is most relevant to the conversation. For example, in 
The Boston Case A the "goal," set by Ed's question, is to determine where Joe is. Sally's 
utterance, so this story goes, puts into play a circumstantial modal. It is most conducive 
for George, or you the kibitzer, to evaluate this proposition-the circumstantial modal-in 
light of the goal. We can explain the availability of more charitable responses such as (97 
a-c) by saying that they are responses to the epistemic modals put into play by Sally's 
utterance (34).41 
Note that the primary criticism of cloudy contextualism from section 2.2.2 no longer 
applies. The criticism was that while it seemed reasonable that Sally's utterance (34) in 
The Boston Case A put into play the epistemic modal propositions associated with the 
groups containing just Sally, just George, and both Sally and George, the argument for 
saying that Sally's utterance (37) in The Boston Case B puts into play an epistemic modal 
proposition associated with a group containing you, the kibitzer, is a bit weak. The idea in 
the former case is that each of those three groups seems to be a natural way to resolve the 
ambiguity, while the justification in the latter case was that you, the kibitzer, were engaged 
in the same investigation. The move simply seems ad hoc. Why think that a reasonable 
way to resolve the ambiguity inherent in (34) is by an epistemic modal whose base takes 
into account what is known by arbitrary individuals also pondering over the prejacent? But 
now on this story we don't need to claim that Sally's utterance (34) puts into play such 
an epistemic modal. Sally's utterance (34) puts into play, among others, a circumstantial 
modal and it is that, Hacking's observation suggests, that the kibitzer is evaluating. 
41Note that my story about conversational pragmatics is slightly different than von Fintel and Gillies. They 
suggest that speakers tend to evaluate the "strongest" proposition put into play, which accounts for their 
intuition that responses like (97 a-c) to (34) are inappropriate. I think it is reasonable to assume that which 
proposition is evaluated depends on the circumstances. Some instances will call for more charity, others not. 
(von Fintel and Gillies, 2011, 19) 
4 Conclusion 
People use Moorean indicative mood modals all the time. Sally says "Joe may be in Boston." 
The doting grandmother says "It's possible that it's a boy, it's possible that it's a girl." The 
mate says "It's possible that the ship is in these waters." But these utterances don't all 
express the same flavor of modality. Some of them clearly express circumstantial modality. 
Some clearly express epistemic modality. And, some "put into play" both readings. The 
utterance in problematic cases falls into the latter category. 
This story takes seriously the observation that there is no single epistemic modal base 
which explains the problematic cases. It is the epistemic reading which motivates the 
speaker to make the utterance and the circumstantial reading which motivates the third-
party to evaluate the utterance as false. This story also takes seriously Hacking's observation 
about objective facts. It explains why practicable investigations seem relevant in some cases 
but not others, or, as the relativist would, say why people sometimes evaluate the utterances 
based on what they know but not always. The former cases are the ones where there is 
a salient circumstantial reading in play, the latter cases where there is a clear epistemic 
reading. This story also does pretty good with the disagreement. The speaker "puts into 
play" a modal proposition which the evaluator denies. 
One of the centeral original claims made here is the argument about retractions: I 
have argued that those cases (of utterances of Moorean indicative mood modals) where 
retractions can be forced are just those cases where there is a salient circumstantial reading. 
That there is a salient circumstantial reading in cases where a retraction is forced is the 
natural conclusion to draw from Hacking's observation. What seems to drive the retraction 
is the seeming relevance of some objective, non-epistemic factor. The suggestion is that the 
objective facts, e.g. Joe being in Berkeley, seem relevant because they are relevant. On the 
other hand, I've argued that retractions can't be forced when Hacking's observation doesn't 
hold, i.e. when objective facts don't seem relevant. 
As sketched in the introduction, it's not difficult to miss the circumstantial reading given 
that both circumstantial and epistemic readings trade in what's possible given some set of 
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facts. The difference between the two lies in perspective. The modal base for epistemic 
modals consists of possible worlds consistent with facts that are known, while the modal 
base for circumstantial modals consists of possible worlds consistent with the circumstances 
(the facts that hold.) They end up looking similar because we generally assess both cir-
cumstantial and epistemic modals based on what is known of the circumstances-it's just 
that in the former case what delimits the modal base is the circumstances while in the later 
case it's what is known of them. 
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